SHEPHERD IN FINAL.DOC

1/12/2009 12:05:26 PM

MONEY, POLITICS, AND IMPARTIAL JUSTICE
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ABSTRACT
A centuries-old controversy asks whether judicial elections are
inconsistent with impartial justice. The debate is especially important
because more than 90 percent of the United States’ judicial business is
handled by state courts, and approximately nine in ten of all state
court judges face the voters in some type of election. Using a stunning
new data set of virtually all state supreme court decisions from 1995 to
1998, this paper provides empirical evidence that elected state supreme
court judges routinely adjust their rulings to attract votes and
campaign money. I find that judges who must be reelected by
Republican voters, especially in partisan elections, tend to decide
cases in accord with standard Republican policy: they are more likely
to vote for businesses over individuals, for employers in labor
disputes, for doctors and hospitals in medical malpractice cases, for
businesses in products liability cases and tort cases generally, and
against criminals in criminal appeals. Judicial behavior is
correspondingly liberal for judges facing reelection by Democrats.
Moreover, I find evidence that judges change their rulings when the
political preferences of the voters change.
In addition, my analysis finds a strong relationship between
campaign contributions and judges’ rulings. Contributions from probusiness groups, pro-labor groups, doctor groups, insurance
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companies, and lawyer groups increase the probability that judges will
vote for the litigants favored by those interest groups. The results
suggest that recent trends in judicial elections—elections becoming
more contested, competitive, and expensive—may have upset the
delicate balance between judicial independence and accountability. I
discuss various policy solutions for reforming states’ systems.
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INTRODUCTION
A centuries-old debate asks whether judicial elections are
inconsistent with impartial justice. The debate is especially important
because more than 90 percent of the United States’ judicial business
1
is handled by state courts, and approximately nine in ten of all state
2
court judges face the voters in some type of election. Using a
stunning new data set of virtually all state supreme court decisions
from 1995 to 1998, this Article provides empirical evidence that
elected state supreme court judges routinely adjust their rulings to
attract votes and campaign money. The results suggest that recent
trends in judicial elections—elections becoming more contested,
competitive, and expensive—may have upset the delicate balance
between judicial independence and accountability.
For many academics, elite lawyers, and federal judges, it is an
assumed truth that judges should be protected completely from public
3
influence. Public pressure on judges to rule a certain way is a
menace. Safety from the menace is found only in providing strict
judicial independence. From this perspective, judicial heroes are
southern federal judges with life tenure resisting racist threats and
public hatred to integrate public schools. Tragedies are the stories of
justices like Rose Bird, whom California voters threw off the state
supreme court in 1986 because she refused to uphold death
4
sentences.

1. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Chief Justice, Wis. Supreme Court, The Ballot and the Bench,
Address at the Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Lecture on State Courts and Social Justice (Mar.
15, 2000), in 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 976 (2001); Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign
Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. &
POL. 57, 77 (1985).
2. Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077 app. 2
at 1105 (2007).
3. See, e.g., Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., Judicial Selection: The Political Roots of Advice and
Consent, in JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICS 3, 4–5 (Nat’l Legal Ctr. for
the Pub. Interest ed., 1990); Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting
Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
273, 277–82 (2002); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995); Robert P. Davidow, Judicial Selection: The
Search for Quality and Representativeness, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 409, 420–22 (1981); Ben F.
Overton, Trial Judges and Political Elections: A Time for Re-Examination, 2 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 9, 15–17 (1988–89); Michael H. Shapiro, Introduction: Judicial Selection and the Design of
Clumsy Institutions, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1555, 1559–63 (1988).
4. See Robert Lindsey, Deukmejian and Cranston Win as 3 Judges Are Ousted, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1986, at A30. For an account of the opposition to Bird, see JOSEPH R. GRODIN,
IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 167–79 (1989).
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Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court recently expressed this
perspective. The Court reluctantly upheld on First Amendment
5
grounds New York’s system for electing judges. But in their
concurrence, Justices Kennedy and Breyer noted:
When one considers that elections require candidates to conduct
campaigns and to raise funds in a system designed to allow for
competition among interest groups and political parties, the
persisting question is whether that process is consistent with the
perception and the reality of judicial independence and judicial
6
excellence.

They concluded:
The rule of law, which is a foundation of freedom, presupposes a
functioning judiciary respected for its independence, its professional
attainments, and the absolute probity of its judges. And it may seem
7
difficult to reconcile these aspirations with elections.

Likewise, Justices Stevens and Souter agreed with “the broader
8
proposition that the very practice of electing judges is unwise.” They
regretfully concluded, “The Constitution does not prohibit
9
legislatures from enacting stupid laws.”
But this independence model for the judiciary is not the only
model that reasonable minds accept. Indeed, the public has
overwhelmingly chosen a different model for the judiciary: the
accountability model. Under this model, judges are accountable to
their constituents because they may not be reelected if they make
rulings with which voters disagree. The federal judges who are the
main examples of the independence model take care of only a sliver
of the country’s litigation. Instead, more than 90 percent of cases in
10
the United States are litigated in state courts, and 89 percent of all
11
state court judges face the voters in some type of election. Moreover,

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 801 (2008).
Id. at 803 (Kennedy & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 801 (Stevens & Souter, JJ., concurring).
Id. (quoting Justice Thurgood Marshall).
Abrahamson, supra note 1, at 976; Schotland, supra note 1, at 77.
Schotland, supra note 2, app. 2 at 1105.
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surveys reveal that over 75 percent of the U.S. public prefers elections
12
over appointments for selecting judges.
In Part I, I discuss how judicial elections are almost as old as the
country itself. The accountability model came to dominate state
courts during the Jacksonian era as a careful, reasoned response to
the perceived lack of accountability of appointed judges. Moreover,
proponents argued, electing judges increased judicial independence
13
rather than reduced it. Elections ensured that judges would be
responsive to the citizens rather than to the officials who appointed
and retained the judges.
Controversy about judicial elections is likewise as old as the
elections. For more than a century, leading academics and lawyers
have called them “mobocracy,” “disgraceful,” “shocking,” and
14
accused them of “destroy[ing] the traditional respect for the bench.”
Likewise, many state judges dislike elections. According to former
Justice Otto Kaus of the California Supreme Court, the pressure of
facing the voters for reelection is like “hav[ing] a crocodile in your
bathtub . . . . You keep wondering whether you’re letting yourself be
influenced, and you do not know. You do not know yourself that
15
well.”
Despite two centuries of controversy about judicial elections,
however, no empirical study has yet addressed one of the central
issues in the controversy: the degree to which the political preferences
of both voters and campaign contributors influence judges’ decisions.
Proponents of the independence model believe that elections and
16
retention politics affect judges’ rulings a lot. In contrast, supporters
17
of the accountability model believe that any influence is modest.
Both groups’ beliefs, however, are based only on anecdote.
The absence of information on this fundamental issue is
especially important because of recent developments in judicial
elections. As I discuss in Parts II and III, three recent trends have

12. See, e.g., GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE:
FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 7 (2001), available at http://faircourts.org/files/JASNational
SurveyResults.pdf.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 31–32.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 26, 71–72.
15. Dan Morain, Kaus to Retire from State Supreme Court; Deplores Strident Attacks on
Justices in Anti-Bird Effort, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1985, at A1 (quoting Justice Otto M. Kaus, Cal.
Supreme Court).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 71–72.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 32–47.
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transformed many judicial campaigns from sleepy boredom to bracing
competition. First, many more judicial elections are being contested,
18
with a challenger running against the incumbent. Second,
19
incumbents are losing at a much higher rate than before. For
example, in partisan elections in 2000, more than 45 percent of
incumbents lost, a much higher loss rate than for elections in both
20
U.S. and state legislatures. Third, recent decades have seen dramatic
21
increases in the amounts of money spent in judicial campaigns. For
example, spending in partisan state supreme court elections averaged
22
more than $1.5 million in 2004. No study has yet addressed whether,
under this newly heated competition for votes and money, judges will
shape their rulings to get them.
This paper fills that gap. I exploit a stunning new data set that
includes detailed information on virtually every state supreme court
case in all fifty states between 1995 and 1998. It includes more than
28,000 cases, involving more than 470 judges. The data include
variables that reflect case histories, case participants, legal issues, case
outcomes, and individual judges’ behavior. Using multivariate
regression techniques, I measure the impact on judges’ rulings of
politics and money: the degree to which individual judges’ rulings are
related to the political preferences both of the people who will decide
whether the judge will be retained and of those who contribute
money to the judge’s campaign.
I explore two distinct routes through which the politics of
elections and campaign contributions from interest groups can
influence judges’ voting. First, the need to attract both votes and
interest groups’ campaign contributions could persuade judges to vote
in certain ways. Second, voters and interest groups may be more
likely to both contribute to the campaigns and vote for the judges
whose votes are consistent with their own preferences. Under both of
these possibilities, elections and interest group contributions
influence state supreme court rulings. In the first case, the influence is
direct, influencing judges to change their votes. In the second the
influence is indirect, increasing the probability that a judge whose

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra text accompanying notes 90–94.
See infra text accompanying notes 95–98.
See infra text accompanying notes 98–99.
See infra text accompanying notes 99–100.
See infra text accompanying note 103.
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votes favor an interest group or group of voters will be reelected. But
the first question is whether there is any influence at all.
In Part IV, I present several empirical results that suggest that
retention politics are associated with judges’ rulings. That is, I find
that under some retention methods, judges’ voting is associated with
the political preferences of those who will decide whether the judges
keep their jobs. For example, the results indicate that when judges
face Republican retention agents in partisan reelections, they are
more likely to vote for businesses over individuals, for employers in
labor disputes, for doctors and hospitals in medical malpractice cases,
for businesses in products liability cases, for original defendants in
tort cases, and against criminals in criminal appeals. The magnitudes
of the marginal effects are substantial but reasonable. For example, a
judge facing a partisan reelection when voters are Republican rather
than Democrat is approximately 36 percentage points more likely to
vote in favor of businesses over individuals.
The results also suggest that, unlike judges facing retention
decisions, judges who do not need to appeal to voters shape their
rulings to voters’ preferences less. For example, voters’ politics has
little effect on the rulings of judges with permanent tenure or who
plan to retire before the next election.
Furthermore, when the preferences of those who will reappoint a
judge change, so too do the judge’s rulings. The results show that
when a Republican governor replaces a Democratic governor, judges
are more likely to vote in favor of the business in a business-versusperson case, in favor of the employer in a labor dispute, and in favor
of defendants in general in tort cases. This is strong evidence for the
hypothesis that retention politics directly influence judges; their
rulings change after a change in retention agents’ preferences, as
proxied by the governor’s party affiliation.
Next, in Part V, I discuss my empirical analysis of the
relationship between interest groups’ campaign contributions and
judges’ voting. The results support the hypothesis that money can buy
justice. That is, I find that contributions from interest groups are
associated with increases in the probability that judges will vote for
the litigants favored by those interest groups. Contributions from probusiness groups are associated with increases in the probability that a
judge will vote for the business litigant in a business-versus-individual
case, in a products liability case, and in tort cases generally.
Contributions from pro-labor groups are associated with reductions in
the probability that judges vote for the employers in labor disputes.
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Contributions from doctor and hospital groups are associated with
increases in the probability that judges vote for the original
defendants (who are often doctors and hospitals) in tort cases.
Contributions from insurance companies are associated with
increases in the probability that judges will vote for those that that the
companies typically insure: businesses in business-versus-person
cases, businesses in products liability cases, and original defendants in
tort cases. In contrast, contributions from lawyers’ groups, whose
members are mainly plaintiffs’ lawyers, are associated with reductions
in the probability that judges will vote for those same litigants that are
typically defendants.
Taken together, the results suggest that the accountability model
may be under stress. If elections ever maintained the delicate balance
between independence and accountability that the original supporters
believed they would, my results suggest that this balance may be at
risk. With increasingly competitive elections and the inflow of
campaign money, some judges may frequently adjust their rulings to
attract votes and dollars.
In Part VI, I discuss various possible policy solutions for
reforming states’ judicial election systems. I first explore the
possibility of granting permanent tenure to state judges, and I discuss
the judicial selection systems in several other countries that have
permanent tenure. Then I discuss other reforms such as eliminating
partisan elections, moving to a system of public financing of judicial
elections, voluntary spending limits on campaign spending, and
stricter recusal rules for judges.
I. THE HISTORICAL TENSION BETWEEN JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE
The modern tension between judicial accountability and judicial
independence is almost as old as the United States itself. The
appointment of state judges originally resembled that of the federal
judiciary. In all of the original thirteen states, judges were appointed
23
either by the executive or legislature. But, in 1812, Georgia became
the first state to amend its Constitution to provide for popular
24
elections for all trial judges. In 1832, Mississippi became the first
23. ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM 14–15 (1955).
24. LARRY C. BERKSON AS UPDATED BY RACHEL CAUFIELD, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y,
JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT 1 (2004), available at
http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/Berkson.pdf.
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state to elect all of its judges, including those on courts of appeals.
Some were aghast. One former member of Mississippi’s supreme
court complained at the time, “Our constitution is the subject of
ridicule in all the States where it is known. It is referred to as a full
26
definition of mobocracy.”
Yet election of judges was an idea whose time had come. “Every
state that entered the union before 1845 did so with an appointed
27
judiciary.” In contrast, each state that entered between 1846 and
28
1959, more than a century later, had judicial elections. By 1865, 24 of
29
the 34 states elected their judges.
The rise of an elected judiciary occurred as part of the
Jacksonian era’s championing of popular democracy. A core value of
Jacksonianism was a distrust of unrepresentative, unaccountable
government officers, and an affection for the mass of ordinary
30
people. Jackson described his core value: “the first principle of our
31
system—that the majority is to govern.” Civic virtue would prevent
the majority from mistreating minorities.
Jackson and his followers worked diligently to steer government
away from promoting narrow interests and special privileges. Jackson
sought to have U.S. senators and representatives elected directly, and
32
to eliminate the electoral college. Similarly, an attempt to eliminate
another unelected elite opened wide the doors to the professions. For
example, requirements for becoming a lawyer were almost completely
eliminated. In almost every state, one could now qualify to practice
law without attending law school and by submitting to only a brief,
33
easy-to-pass oral exam. The new openness permitted a poor boy

25. Id.
26. EDWIN ARTHUR MILES, JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY IN MISSISSIPPI 42 (1960) (quoting
NATCHEZ (Miss.), Nov. 9, 1832); see also Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly
Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 190, 190 (1993) (commenting on Mississippi’s submission of the appellate court to the
electorate, “[a]lthough Indiana and Georgia had been electing trial judges for years, the election
of appellate judges seemed beyond the pale”).
27. Nelson, supra note 26, at 190.
28. See BERKSON & CAUFIELD, supra note 24, at 1.
29. Id.
30. See Nelson, supra note 26, at 222.
31. HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA
97 (1990) (quoting Andrew Jackson).
32. Nelson, supra note 26, at 222–23.
33. George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA Accreditation
and Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091, 2115, 2123 (1998).
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from a backwoods cabin to become a leading Illinois lawyer and
president.
The movement to elect judges fit the Jacksonian philosophy
perfectly. State after state established an elective judiciary only after
34
long, cautious debate in constitutional conventions. Supporters came
to believe that appointing judges did not ensure judicial
35
36
independence. Influences on judges were inevitable. If judges were
appointed, then this influence would come from the officials who
37
appointed and retained them; that is, judges would shape their
rulings to please the governors and legislators. It was preferable
instead that this influence come directly from the people, through
popular elections. In the Massachusetts convention, one delegate said
of judges: “They are men, and they are influenced by the
communities, the societies and the classes in which they live, and the
question now is, not whether they shall be influenced at all, . . . but
38
from what quarter that influence shall come.” In the Kentucky
convention, another delegate answered that the judge “is to look
somewhere for his bread, and that is to come from the people. He is
to look somewhere for approbation, and that is to come from the
39
people.”
Moreover, the judiciary could function as a check and balance on
the other governmental branches only if it truly were independent of
them. A judge who was appointed by the executive or legislature, and
so beholden to them, could not be truly independent of them. The
only means to a truly independent judiciary was election by the
people. As noted in the Illinois debates, because “one object of the
judiciary was to protect the people from the other branches of the

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Nelson, supra note 26, at 222–24.
Id.
Id. at 217.
Id.
2 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE
CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED MAY 4TH, 1853, TO REVISE AND AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 773 (Boston, White & Potter 1853) [hereinafter
MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1853] (statement of Edward Keyes).
39. REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY 1849, at 273 (Frankfort, A.G.
Hodges & Co. 1849) [hereinafter KENTUCKY CONVENTION OF 1849] (statement of Francis
Bristow).
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40

government,” it was necessary that the judiciary was “above the
41
control of the legislative or executive departments.”
In addition, supporters believed that voters, not politicians,
42
would select the best judges. The appointment process too often led
to the selection of party hacks, with the judiciary often serving as
pleasant pasture for failed but loyal politicians who had lost
43
elections.
Finally, supporters argued that elections would ensure a judiciary
that had the optimal combination of independence and contact with
the people’s will. They believed that elections would not pervasively
bias judges’ decisions; the judges’ consciences would assure that.
Instead, the elections would offer a modest disciplining force that
would induce judges not to stray dramatically from the people’s
preferences. A delegate to the Massachusetts convention explained
the harms of excessive independence: “I like to have independent and
upright men in all public stations, but I do not like the idea of having
any public officers entirely independent of the people. I think they
should be so dependent at least, as to have an eye to the power they
44
serve.” Similarly, an Indiana delegate explained how elections might
help to create the proper relationship between judge and people, the
right balance of independence and accountability: “I do not say that
he should be so much under their influence as to be awed into
45
decisions, but merely that he should understand their will.”
The convention delegates strove to create a system that gave
46
judges strong incentives to heed the public good. As a leading
commentator notes, “the judiciary became elective not so much to

40. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES OF 1847, at 466 (Arthur Charles Cole ed., 1919)
[hereinafter ILLINOIS CONVENTION OF 1847] (statement of Archibald Williams).
41. Id.
42. See Kermit L. Hall, The ‘Route to Hell’ Retraced: The Impact of Popular Election on the
Southern Appellate Judiciary, 1832–1920, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
SOUTH 229, 230 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1983); Nelson, supra note 26,
at 200.
43. Id.
44. MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1853, supra note 38, at 785 (statement of Rodney
French).
45. 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1662 (Indianapolis, A.H. Brown
1850) [hereinafter INDIANA CONVENTION OF 1850] (statement of Henry Thornton).
46. See Nelson, supra note 26, at 224.
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permit the people to choose honest judges as to keep judges honest
47
once they reached the bench.”
Nevertheless, the supporters of an elected judiciary recognized
that elected judges might occasionally feel excessive pressure from
48
excited voter majorities. The supporters felt, however, that this
danger was less than the dangers of an appointive system. In an
appointive system, the officials who appointed and retained the
49
judges would exert even greater influence and pressure on them.
Even a judge who was appointed for life would be forever beholden
to the official who had appointed him. Moreover, appointed judges,
especially those with life tenure, were examples of what Jacksonians
50
feared most: unelected government officials with unchecked power.
Because a judge with life tenure is unaccountable to the people, the
judge is, in effect, in the same position as a dictator.
Careful structuring of the election process could reduce any
51
dangers of excessive popular influence. For example, in most states,
52
judges would have long terms. The terms would be staggered; this
would assure that all judges could not be thrown out together in a fit
53
of popular excitement. Judges would not be permitted to run for
54
other elected offices during their terms. Finally, elections would be
55
by district, rather than at large. This would again reduce the
possibility that an excited state-wide majority could remove large
numbers of judges.
This accountability model—judicial independence tempered by
modest popular influence through a carefully structured election
system—continued to flourish even after its initial success in the mid56
57
1800s. The number of states with elected judges continued to grow.
Contemporary examples suggest the accountability model has
had some success in achieving its historical proponents’ goals. First, it

47. Id.
48. Id. at 218; Schotland, supra note 2, at 1094.
49. See, e.g., KENTUCKY CONVENTION OF 1849, supra note 39, at 270 (statement of James
Guthrie); id. at 225 (statement of Squire Turner).
50. See Nelson, supra note 26, at 222.
51. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1094.
52. Id.
53. Nelson, supra note 26, at 218.
54. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1094.
55. Nelson, supra note 26, at 218.
56. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1093–94.
57. Id. at 1093.
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promotes selection of judges whose values reflect those of the public.
Alan Page’s 1992 election to the Minnesota Supreme Court is one
58
example. Page is an African-American former professional football
59
star who had become a successful lawyer. He was unable for years to
convince politicians to appoint him to any judgeship in Minnesota,
60
trial or appellate. His lack of success may have been due to
stereotypes about the intelligence of football players, especially
African-American ones, that he saw arising during his later
61
campaign. Unable to gain appointment, he filed to be a candidate in
an election for the supreme court. He was elected in a landslide, with
62
61 percent of the vote. Although opinions may differ about whether
other appointed candidates would have been better judges than Page,
the election results indicate that his appointment represented the
people’s will.
Second, the accountability model has succeeded in removing
judges who stray substantially from voters’ preferences. A recent
example is Jack Hampton, a Texas district court judge, who imposed
an unusually light sentence on a defendant who had been convicted of
63
killing two gay men. He explained:
These homosexuals, by running around on weekends picking up
teen-age boys, they’re asking for trouble . . . . I don’t care much for
queers cruising the streets picking up teen-age boys.
. . . I put prostitutes and gays at about the same level. And I’d be
64
hard put to give somebody life for killing a prostitute.

Although the State Commission on Judicial Conduct censured
65
Hampton for his remarks, it did not remove him from office. When
he ran for a seat on the Texas court of appeals, however, he was
66
defeated. His opponent received approximately 20 percent of her

58. Id. at 1091.
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting Alan C. Page, Justice, Address at the Summit on Improving Judicial
Selection (Dec. 8–9, 2000)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independences, 95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1047 (2007).
64. Lisa Belkin, Report Clears Judge of Bias in Remarks About Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 1989, at A25 (quoting Jack Hampton, Judge, Dallas County Criminal Dist. Court).
65. Karlan, supra note 63, at 1047–48.
66. Gay Rights Groups Hail Defeat of Judge in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at B20.
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campaign contributions from gay and lesbian groups. Hampton’s
68
remarks and decision in the case were major issues in the campaign.
Judge Hampton’s ruling may have been sincere and based on his
conscience. Proponents of the accountability model, however, believe
that the judge’s conscience should not necessarily triumph over the
69
consciences of the voters. As Professor Karlan notes, “once we move
away from decisions in particular cases and toward the
pronouncement of general legal rules, it is even less clear that
individuals ought to be selected or retained without regard for their
viewpoints. . . . To some extent, then, judges should pay attention to
70
popular views.” According to this approach, judges do not prostitute
themselves by responding to a modest extent to voters’ views any
more than any elected representatives do.
Despite both the successes and the public support for judicial
elections, angry criticisms of the elected judiciary continued on after
its inception. Periodically, ardent supporters of the independence
model, often elite academics and bar leaders, have lashed out at the
pervasive policy of electing judges. One such period was as the
beginning of the twentieth century. Ex-President William Howard
Taft blustered in 1913 that judicial elections were “disgraceful” and
71
“so shocking . . . that we ought to condemn [them].” Likewise,
Professor Roscoe Pound stated: “Putting courts into politics and
compelling judges to become politicians, in many jurisdictions has
72
almost destroyed the traditional respect for the bench.”
Yet the dominance of the accountability model endures and is
increasing. It has prevailed in all except federal courts and a sliver of
state courts. When President Taft and Professor Pound raged a
73
century ago, eight in ten state court judges were subject to election.
74
As of 2004, approximately nine in ten were.
Nevertheless, some states have modified aspects of their judicial
elections. For example, by 1927, twelve states had switched from
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 63, at 1048.
70. Id.
71. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, POPULAR GOVERNMENT: ITS ESSENCE, ITS PERMANENCE
AND ITS PERILS 194–95 (1913).
72. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
40 AM. L. REV. 729, 748 (1906).
73. Guilty, Your Honour?, ECONOMIST, July 24, 2004, at 28, 29.
74. Id.
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partisan elections, which revealed judges’ party affiliations, to
75
nonpartisan elections. Other states moved to another election
variation, the so-called “merit selection plan,” also commonly known
as the “Missouri Plan” after Missouri became the first state to adopt it
76
in 1940. Under merit selection plans, a bipartisan judicial nominating
commission reviews applications for judgeships and then compiles a
77
list of qualified applicants. The governor then appoints one of the
78
candidates from the commission’s list. Once appointed, the judge
regularly faces unopposed nonpartisan retention elections; the ballot
asks only whether the judge should be retained, and does not mention
79
party affiliation.
This long historical evolution has led to variations of the
accountability model. The modern selection methods are partisan
elections, nonpartisan elections, gubernatorial appointment,
legislative elections, legislative appointments, and merit plans.
Although in many states the methods of selection and retention are
the same, in other states they are different. The following are the
combinations that states have chosen:
1. Judges selected through gubernatorial appointment and merit
plans are retained through gubernatorial reappointment,
legislative elections, unopposed retention elections, or
reappointment by a judicial nominating commission.
2. Judges selected through legislative appointments are retained
through legislative reappointments.
3. Judges that are originally elected in partisan elections are
retained through partisan elections or unopposed retention
elections.
4. Judges originally elected in nonpartisan elections are retained
only through nonpartisan elections.

75. BERKSON & CAUFIELD, supra note 24, at 2.
76. Id.
77. Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States Are Responding to
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections Are Changing, 38 AKRON
L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2005) (citing BERKSON & CAUFIELD, supra note 24, at 2).
78. Id.
79. Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for a System of Judicial “Merit” Selection, 67 ALB.
L. REV. 803, 804 (2004).
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Table 1 shows each state’s methods of selection and retention for
80
the study period, 1995 to 1998.
81

Table 1. Methods of Selection and Retention by State
Selection

Selection

Method

Method

for Full

Method of

State

Term

Retention

State

Term

Retention

Alabama

P

P

Montana

N

N

for Full

Method of

Alaska

M

R

Nebraska

M

R

Arizona

M

R

Nevada

N

N

Arkansas

P

P

New Hampshire

G

—

California

G

R

New Jersey

G

G

M

R

New Mexico

P

P

Colorado
Connecticut

83

82

LA

LA

New York

M

G

Delaware

M

G

North. Carolina

P

P

Florida

M

R

North Dakota

N

N

84

Georgia

N

N

Ohio

Hawaii

M

J

Oklahoma

N

N

M

R

Idaho

N

N

Oregon

N

N

Illinois

P

R

Pennsylvania

P

R

Indiana

M

R

Rhode Island

M

—

85

Iowa

M

R

South Carolina

LE

LE

Kansas

M

R

South Dakota

M

R

80. Although there are other differences between the selection and retention methods of
each state, they are generally grouped into these primary categories. See BERKSON &
CAUFIELD, supra note 24, at 2.
81. DAVID B. ROTTMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION,
1998, at 21–25 tbl.4 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin No. NCJ 178932, 2000), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco98.pdf; Am. Judicature Soc’y, Methods of Judicial
Selection, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?
state= (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). G = gubernatorial appointment or reappointment, P = partisan
election or reelection, N = nonpartisan election or reelection, LA = legislative appointment or
reappointment, LE = legislative election or reelection, M = merit plan, R = retention election,
and J = reappointment by a judicial nominating commission.
82. In New Hampshire, judges serve until age seventy. ROTTMAN ET AL., supra note 81, at
28 n.18.
83. In Connecticut, the Governor nominates candidates from a merit-commission list, and
the legislature appoints. Id. at 25 tbl.4.
84. In Ohio, political parties nominate candidates that are then chosen in nonpartisan
elections. Id. at 28 n.24.
85. In Rhode Island, judges have life tenure. Id. at 28 n.27.
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Kentucky

N

N

Tennessee

M

N

Louisiana

P

P

Texas

P

P

Maine

G

G

Utah

M

R
LE

Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan

87

86

M

R

Vermont

M

M

—

Virginia

LA

LA

N

N

Washington

N

N

Minnesota

N

N

West Virginia

P

P

Mississippi

N

N

Wisconsin

N

N

Missouri

M

R

Wyoming

M

R

The states’ judicial selection and retention methods continue to
provoke hot controversy. The states face the same concerns they
faced two hundred years ago: which methods achieve the best balance
of judicial independence and accountability. With almost 90 percent
of all state judges facing voters in some way, however, and almost 90
percent of all state appellate judges being subject to a retention
88
decision by either voters or other politicians, a critical issue is the
degree to which election pressures influence judges’ decisions.
II. THE THREAT FROM STATE COURTS’ INCREASED
POLITICIZATION
As those who implemented it first indicated, the accountability
model functions properly only if judicial elections’ impact on judges’
decisions is modest and in the background. The model’s success
depends on elections creating an appropriate balance between
independence and accountability, with judges mindful of the public
will but not slaves to it. If, instead, judicial elections profoundly and
pervasively influence how judges decide cases, then judicial
impartiality is lost and the accountability model fails.
Three trends in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century
89
have created threats to this delicate balance. The trends have
increased politicization of state supreme courts and elections, and
they have created pressure for justices to behave and rule politically.
86. In Massachusetts, judges serve until age seventy. Id. at 28 n.8.
87. In Michigan, political parties nominate candidates that are then chosen in nonpartisan
elections. Id. at 28 n.12.
88. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CALL TO ACTION: STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL
SUMMIT ON IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION 12 (2002), available at http://www.ncsconline.org
/D_Research/CallToActionCommentary.pdf.
89. See, e.g., Nathan Richard Wilderman, Casenote, Bought Elections: Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 765, 769–72 (2003).
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First, the fraction of contested elections, in which a new
candidate challenges the incumbent, has increased. The fraction has
90
always been higher in partisan systems than in nonpartisan systems.
Both partisan and nonpartisan systems, however, have recently
91
experienced increases in the number of contested elections. In 1984,
92
only 33 percent of nonpartisan elections were contested. By 2000,
93
this number had increased to 75 percent. Likewise, 75 percent of
94
partisan elections were contested in 1988. By 2000, this number had
95
grown to 95 percent.
Second, as elections have become more contested, incumbents in
partisan elections have found it harder to win. Mirroring the
differences in the percentage of contested races for nonpartisan and
partisan elections, incumbents in nonpartisan elections are much
96
more likely to be reelected than those in partisan elections. Whereas
approximately 7 percent of incumbents were defeated in nonpartisan
elections between 1980–2000, approximately 23 percent of
97
incumbents were defeated in partisan elections. Moreover, the loss
rate for incumbents has increased dramatically in partisan elections
over this period. In 1980, 26.3 percent of incumbents were defeated in
1980, but in 2000, the loss rate for incumbents was a stunning 45.5
98
percent, much higher than the rate at which incumbents lose in the
99
U.S. House or Senate or in state legislatures.
The third trend is the dramatic increase in spending on judicial
campaigns from the 1990s to the early twenty-first century. The
average contested state supreme court race in 1990, including both
90. Chris W. Bonneau, Patterns of Campaign Spending and Electoral Competition in State
Supreme Court Elections, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 21, 27 tbl.6 (2004); Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda
Gann Hall, Predicting Challengers in State Supreme Court Elections: Context and the Politics of
Institutional Design, 56 POL. RES. Q. 337, 343 tbl.2 (2003).
91. Bonneau, supra note 90, at 27 tbl.6.
92. Bonneau & Hall, supra note 90, at 343 tbl.2.
93. Bonneau, supra note 90, at 27 tbl.6.
94. Bonneau & Hall, supra note 90, at 343 tbl.2.
95. Bonneau, supra note 90, at 27 tbl.6.
96. Melinda Gann Hall, Judging the Election Returns: Competition as Accountability in
State Supreme Court Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL,
AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 165, 178 tbl.9.5 (Matthew Streb ed., 2007).
97. Id. at 177 tbl.9.4.
98. Id.
99. Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths
of Judicial Reform, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 315, 319 (2001); Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W.
Bonneau, Does Quality Matter? Challengers in State Supreme Court Elections, 50 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 20, 21 (2006).

SHEPHERD IN FINAL.DOC

2009]

1/12/2009 12:05:26 PM

MONEY, POLITICS, AND IMPARTIAL JUSTICE

641

partisan and nonpartisan contests, involved $364,348 in campaign
100
101
spending. A similar race in 2004 cost $892,755.
Spending in partisan elections has increased substantially more
than spending in nonpartisan elections. Between 1990 and 2004,
average campaign spending in nonpartisan elections increased by
approximately 100 percent, from approximately $300,000 to
102
$600,000. In contrast, average spending in partisan elections during
this period increased from approximately $425,000 to $1.5 million, an
103
increase of over 250 percent.
The expense of state supreme court races varies greatly among
the states. Table 2 presents the average spending on state supreme
court races between 1994 and 2000, by state. The states with the most
expensive campaigns are states that elect judges in partisan elections.
Moreover, the most expensive nonpartisan states (Ohio and
Michigan) are states that nominate candidates in partisan primaries
104
but use nonpartisan general elections.
Table 2. Average Spending per Supreme Court Campaign,
105
by State, 1990–2004
State

Average Spending per
Campaign

Pennsylvania
Alabama
Illinois
Ohio
Texas Supreme Court
Louisiana
Michigan
West Virginia
Mississippi
Nevada

2,250,773
1,450,673
1,371,590
1,193,205
1,155,125
1,080,113
927,019
887,218
599,251
593,816

100. Chris W. Bonneau, The Dynamics of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court
Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 96, at 59, 63.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 63 fig.4.1.
103. Id.
104. For a thorough explanation of differences in campaign spending among the states, see
id. at 63–68.
105. The information in this table can be found in Bonneau’s article. Id. at 67 tbl.4.2.
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Wisconsin
Kentucky

559,505
422,063

North Carolina
Montana
Georgia
New Mexico
Arkansas
Washington
Oregon
Idaho
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals106
Minnesota

366,742
359,974
289,865
273,398
264,320
205,601
183,107
124,579
116,841
108,185

[Vol. 58:623

The cost of supreme court campaigns, especially in partisan
elections, has risen so dramatically that it is often difficult, if not
impossible, for candidates to win elections without substantial
107
funding. In 1997–1998, the top campaign fundraiser prevailed in
approximately 75 percent of contested state supreme court races, and
108
in 2001–2002, the top fundraiser won in 80 percent of the elections.
Thus, with few exceptions, more money is a prelude to victory.
Four forces have contributed to the growth in competitiveness
and expense of judicial elections. The forces are not all independent;
many cause or reinforce each other. First, in the mid-1970s, people
discovered that vigorously contesting a judicial election could be
effective. Until then, judicial elections were “low-key affairs,
109
conducted with civility and dignity,” which were “as exciting as a
110
game of checkers. Played by mail.” Then in Los Angeles in 1978, a
group of deputy district attorneys offered to support any candidate
111
who would run against an unopposed incumbent trial judge. This

106. Because of issues like tort reform, and the accompanying interest group involvement,
Texas Supreme Court elections are significantly more expensive than elections to the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. at 67.
107. Bonneau, supra note 90, at 32 & tbl.11; Wilderman, supra note 89, at 769–80.
108. It is possible that more money does not cause victory; instead, pending victory may
create the inflow of money. Donors may be generous with the candidate that they expect to win,
even if the candidate would win without the money.
109. Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One “Best” Method?, 23
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 19 (1995).
110. William C. Bayne, Lynchard’s Candidacy, Ads Putting Spice into Justice Race, COM.
APPEAL (Memphis), Oct. 29, 2000, at DS1.
111. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1080.
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led to “an unprecedented number of contests and defeated judges.”
Others recognized the possibilities of this technical innovation, and
113
copied it.
Second, campaigns may be more competitive and expensive
because the stakes may be higher. State supreme courts may have
increased in power and influence during recent decades. For example,
case filings have increased dramatically, with the number of cases
filed in some state appellate courts doubling every ten years between
114
the 1960s and 1980s. The second half of the twentieth century has
also brought an increase in controversial cases in state courts, such as
environmental protection, the rights of criminal defendants, abortion,
115
political apportionment, and industry-wide liability for toxic torts.
In addition, the new judicial federalism following the federal
government’s increasing tendency to devolve power to the states has
116
enhanced the power of the states’ supreme courts.
Third, interest groups, many from outside the state, have become
117
powerfully active in judicial elections, thrusting large amounts of
money into them. Between 1968 and 1988, the number of registered
special interest groups in the United States doubled from 10,300 to
118
20,600. Similarly, during the 1940s, there were only five hundred
registered lobbyists in Washington; as of 2000 there were over
119
25,000. The increase in interest group involvement was originally
120
isolated to legislative and executive elections. It soon spread to
judicial elections, however, as interest groups found this a costeffective means to influence state policy; it was cheaper and easier to
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE STATE COURTS,
1999–2000: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 76 (Brian J.
Ostrom, Neal B. Kauder, Robert C. LaFoundtain eds., 2001).
115. ABA COMM’N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY 14 (2003).
116. See id. at 15 (“While federal and state courts both witnessed an upsurge in the
controversial, policy-laden cases they were called upon to decide in the latter half of the
twentieth century, this trend has become especially noticeable in state court systems. . . . [S]tate
courts have become a new forum of choice for litigation of constitutional rights and
responsibilities, which has placed them in the political spotlight with increasing frequency.”).
117. See id. at 8–9, 18.
118. See G. Calvin MacKenzie, The Revolution Nobody Wanted, TIMES LITERARY
SUPPLEMENT (London), Oct. 13, 2000, at 13.
119. Id.
120. See David Goldberger, The Power of Special Interest Groups to Overwhelm Judicial
Election Campaigns: The Troublesome Interaction Between the Code of Judicial Conduct,
Campaign Finance Laws, and the First Amendment, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2, 4–5 (2003).
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affect the outcome of a judicial election than the outcome of a
121
legislative or executive branch election.
The significant interest group involvement in state judicial
elections began in Texas in the 1980s when business interests and
122
trial-lawyers’ groups fought over tort reform. In most states, the
majority of the contributions to state judicial campaigns comes from
123
groups hoping to shape tort law. The major opponents are trial
lawyers and unions, on one side, who tend to promote the candidacies
of judges who favor tort plaintiffs. Against them are business interests
and professional groups, such as physicians, who tend to promote the
candidacies of defendant-friendly judges.
Criminal justice is also an important issue for interests groups.
During the 1980s and 1990s, three high-profile incumbent losses in
state supreme courts involved criminal justice issues. In 1986, three
California Supreme Court Justices, including Rose Bird, were
124
defeated in an expensive retention-election battle. Commentators
attribute their defeats to the substantial funds raised by interest
125
groups that opposed the justices’ anti-death penalty rulings.
Similarly, Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White lost a
retention election in 1996, largely because of interest group
126
opposition to her anti-death penalty rulings. In that same year,
Judge David Lanphier was the target of a well-funded interest group
campaign opposing his reelection to the Nebraska Supreme Court
because he had vacated several murder convictions during his
127
previous term.
Fourth, changes in the law permitting judges to participate more
openly and aggressively in judicial campaigns has contributed to the
increasing competitiveness of judicial elections. Until 1990, a canon of
judicial conduct in the ABA Model Code had prohibited judges from
128
announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues. That

121. Id.
122. See Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1483, 1487 (2005).
123. Id.
124. Anthony Champagne, Political Parties and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1411, 1420 (2001); Lindsey, supra note 4.
125. See Champagne, supra note 124, at 1420.
126. Id.
127. Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Judicial Retention Elections: The Defeat of Justices
Lanphier and White, in RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 1999 41, 52–54 (2000).
128. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1989).
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year, the ABA eliminated the canon because of First Amendment
129
concerns. Soon, twenty-five of the thirty-four states that had
130
adopted it eliminated it. In 2002, the Supreme Court struck down
131
enforcement of the canon in the remaining nine states. Other
appellate courts have struck down limits on judges’ fundraising,
132
partisan conduct, and making pledges and commitments.
I now examine theoretical predictions about the impact that
more competitiveness and money will have on judges’ independence
and accountability.
III. PREDICTED EFFECTS OF INCREASING POLITICIZATION ON
JUDGES’ DECISIONS
The increasing politicization of both state supreme courts and
elections to them may affect judges’ levels of independence and
accountability. If the influence of election pressures on judges’
judicial decisions is nonexistent or modest, then this would support
arguments of proponents of the accountability model. They argue
that judicial elections will operate at most as a moderate constraint on
judges, but without warping their decisions. In contrast, if elections
influence judges’ decisions strongly, then this would support the
independence model. It would suggest that, unless judges are freed
completely from election pressures, their decisions will be
fundamentally biased.
I now discuss the potential impacts on judges’ decisions of the
increasing competitiveness of state supreme court elections and the
increasing importance of campaign contributions.

129. ABA ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 355–58 (Arthur Garwin ed.,
2004).
130. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1095 n.77.
131. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002); Schotland, supra note 2,
at 1095 n.77.
132. E.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 754, 765–66 (8th Cir. 2005)
(striking down limits on judges’ partisan conduct and personal solicitation of campaign
contributions); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002) (striking down a
solicitation clause, which failed strict scrutiny); see also Schotland, supra note 2, at 1095–97
(discussing White).
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A. The Increasing Need to Appeal to Constituents
As of 2006, 87 percent of state appellate judges must regularly
133
face the voters to keep their jobs. These judges may have an
incentive to rule strategically if doing so helps them get reelected. The
hypothesis that reelection concerns influence judges’ voting is an
134
extension of the electoral-incentive theory, which is the central
principle in theories about legislative politics and empirical analyses
of it. This theory, which was a new way of thinking about the
behavior and incentives of legislators when it was introduced in the
135
1970s, asserts that a candidate’s primary goal is to be reelected.
Because candidates cannot achieve any other goals if they are not
elected, election is their overriding goal. Extending this theory to
state supreme courts, judges without life tenure have the incentive to
decide cases in ways that benefit the litigants favored by the people
responsible for retaining judges (the retention agents). This is true
whether the retention agent is a politician who decides whether to
reappoint the judge or the voters in a retention election. For example,
if a judge expects to face reelection by conservative, pro-business
voters, she may have an incentive to favor business litigants.
Although all nontenured judges have the incentive to rule
136
strategically if they believe it will help them gain reelection, the
increasing competitiveness of elections has increased the pressures on

133. Eighty-seven percent of state appellate court judges must be retained through either
partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, or retention elections. SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND,
CHANTAL G. BROMAGE & WILLIAM E. RAFTERY, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE
COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2006: SUPPLEMENT TO EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS, 2006, at 96–97 fig.G (2007), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/
2006_files/IntroductiontoSCCS06.pdf. In contrast, I earlier explained that 89 percent of all state
judges (appellate and trial) face voters at some point, either in the initial election or when
seeking retention. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
134. See DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 11–78 (1974)
(describing the electoral-incentive theory).
135. Id. at 13.
136. See Lawrence Baum, State Supreme Courts: Activism and Accountability, in THE STATE
OF THE STATES 103, 126 (Carl E. Van Horn ed., 1989) (“Increasingly, judges who wish to
maintain their positions will take into account the possibility of opposition from interest groups
and from the electorate as a whole.”); PHILIP DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 30 (1980) (“By exercising their control
over the selection and tenure of public officials, voters can set effective limits upon the policy
initiatives of the government.”); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?
(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 1, 41 (1993) (“[M]y
analysis predicts that judges elected for a term . . . are more responsive to the current balance of
political power, hence less ‘independent.’”).
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judges. The increasing rates at which incumbents are defeated,
especially in partisan elections, should heighten the pressure on
judges to rule in a way that will help them be reelected. The political
pressure on judges who face reelection may be even stronger than the
pressure that legislators confront. Incumbent state supreme court
justices in judicial elections are more likely to be defeated than
incumbents in the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate and
137
state legislatures. From 1990 through 2000, reelection rates were
approximately 94.1 percent in the U.S. House of Representatives,
89.3 percent in the U.S. Senate, 85.1 percent in state houses, and 84.1
138
percent in state supreme courts.
Like Chief Justice Rose Bird in California and Justice Penny
White in Tennessee, many examples exist of judges that have been
unseated over decisions that were unpopular with the retention
139
agents. Campaigns have been mounted to unseat incumbent judges
in Mississippi, Nebraska, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Illinois, California,
Georgia, Idaho, Alabama, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Texas based
on their unpopular judicial decisions in areas including crime control,
victims’ rights, abortion, homosexual rights, water rights, school
140
funding, and tort reform.
Many judges have admitted that reelection concerns may
influence their judicial rulings. For example, former California
Supreme Court Justice Otto M. Kaus commented: “[T]o this day, I
don’t know to what extent I was subliminally motivated by the thing
you could not forget—that it might do you some good politically to
141
vote one way or the other.” Justice Kaus, who also likened election
142
pressure to having a crocodile in the bathtub, then changed animals.
“When you’re eating dinner with a gorilla, it’s hard to make small
143
talk, even when he’s using the right knife and fork.”
Similarly, when participating in a series of interviews with the
members of Louisiana’s high court, a liberal justice acknowledged
that:

137. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
138. Hall & Bonneau, supra note 99, at 21.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 124–27.
140. See Charles G. Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 49–50 (2003).
141. Philip Hager, Kaus Urges Reelection of Embattled Court Justices, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28,
1986, at 3 (quoting Justice Otto M. Kaus, Cal. Supreme Court).
142. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
143. Hager, supra note 141 (quoting Justice Otto M. Kaus, Cal. Supreme Court).
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his perception of his constituents was that they clearly preferred the
death penalty as a punishment for murder and that they would
retaliate against him at election time if the justice did not reflect
constituent preferences in this set of judicial decisions . . . [and] he
does not dissent in death penalty cases against an opinion of the
court to affirm a defendant’s conviction and sentence, expressly
because of a perceived voter sanction, in spite of his deeply felt
144
personal preferences to the contrary.

Despite these anecdotes, no prior empirical paper has shown that
the retention agents’ political preferences influence judicial voting.
Some recent empirical studies have found other relationships
between elections and judicial behavior. Some studies have shown
that litigation patterns vary under different judicial selection systems.
For example, litigation rates are lower in states where judges are
elected, suggesting that elected judges’ political voting reduces
145
uncertainty about court decisions so that more cases settle.
Similarly, plaintiffs file more antidiscrimination claims in states that
elect judges than in states that appoint judges; elected judges may
have stronger pro-employee preferences, inducing more employees to
146
file claims.
Other studies have shown that the behavior of elected judges
changes as reelection approaches. The judges deviate from earlier
147
148
voting patterns, impose longer criminal sentences, and side with
149
the majority in death penalty cases.
Still other studies find that judges’ behavior varies under
different selection methods, especially under systems with partisan
elections. For example, judges who face partisan elections are less

144. Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes
and a Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1117, 1120 (1987).
145. F. Andrew Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of
Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 210 (1999).
146. Timothy Besley & A. Abigail Payne, Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy:
Does Judicial Discretion Matter?, 1, 18 (London Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci., Research Paper
No. PEPP04, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1158326.
147. See Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts,
54 J. POL. 427, 442 (1992).
148. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind
when It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248 (2004).
149. Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from the
American States, 48 POL. RES. Q. 5, 24 (1995); Hall, supra note 147, at 442.

SHEPHERD IN FINAL.DOC

2009]

1/12/2009 12:05:26 PM

MONEY, POLITICS, AND IMPARTIAL JUSTICE

649

150

likely to dissent on politically controversial issues, less likely to rule
151
for challengers to a regulatory status quo, and more likely to
redistribute wealth in tort cases from out-of-state businesses to in152
state plaintiffs. Not all studies find such results, however; one of the
most recent papers finds almost no evidence of elected judges
153
responding to political pressure.
No other paper, however, has addressed the bottom-line issue of
whether judges bend their rulings to appeal to those who will be
deciding whether they keep their jobs.
B. The Increasing Need to Raise Campaign Funds
Because the cost of winning a judicial election has increased
154
dramatically, judges feel pressure to rule in ways that will help them
to obtain campaign funds. Although mine is the first analysis to
examine the relationship between interest group contributions and
judges’ voting, the public certainly believes that judges are influenced
by interest groups. A nationwide survey has revealed that 76 percent
of voters and 26 percent of judges believe that campaign
155
contributions have at least some influence on judges’ decisions.
By appealing to special interest groups, judges can increase their
chances of receiving future campaign contributions from those
groups. Money from interest groups may influence judges’ voting in
two ways. First, the influence may be direct: judges may bend their
rulings in a way that will help them obtain future campaign funds
from interest groups.

150. See Hall, supra note 147, at 442 (“District-based elections . . . influence liberal justices
to join conservative majorities in death penalty cases in Texas, North Carolina, Louisiana, and
Kentucky.”).
151. Andrew Hanssen, Independent Courts and Administrative Agencies: An Empirical
Analysis of the States, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 534, 567–68 (2000).
152. Eric Helland & Alex Tabarrok, The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards, 4
AM. L. ECON. REV. 341, 345–46 (2002); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics:
The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 158 (1999).
153. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The
Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary 19–22 (Univ. of Chi.
Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 357, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008989.
154. See supra notes 100–07 and accompanying text.
155. GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., supra note 12, at 4; GREENBERG
QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE—STATE JUDGES FREQUENCY
QUESTIONNAIRE 5 (2002), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASJudgesSurvey
Results.pdf.
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Second, the influence may be indirect. Interest groups may give
campaign contributions to judges who happen to rule in the way that
the interest groups prefer, increasing the judges’ chances of
reelection. Although under this theory the contributions do not cause
any individual judge to rule differently; rather the contributions
indirectly influence case outcomes by increasing the probability that
judges who share the interest groups’ preferences are elected.
Although no study has yet explored these influences in judicial
elections, several studies have addressed congressional contests.
Analyses of the determinants of congressional voting have identified
both direct and indirect influences from interest groups’ campaign
contributions. Empirical studies of the U.S. Congress show that
contributions from political action committees directly influence
156
congressional voting. The studies suggest that the possibility of
raising future campaign funds provides an incentive for legislators to
157
vote in the way that interest groups prefer.
In addition, other studies have shown that interest groups have
an additional indirect influence on congressional voting. They use
their wealth to increase the probability that the people elected will
158
share their political ideologies. Thus, the interest groups influence
congressional voting not by giving money to legislators to change

156. See, e.g., John P. Frendreis & Richard W. Waterman, PAC Contributions and
Legislative Behavior: Senate Voting on Trucking Deregulation, 66 SOC. SCI. Q. 401, 407–09
(1986); Woodrow Jones, Jr. & K. Robert Keiser, Issue Visibility and the Effects of PAC Money,
68 SOC. SCI. Q. 170, 175 (1987); Laura I. Langbein & Mark Lotwis, The Political Efficacy of
Lobbying and Money: Gun Control in the U.S. House, 1986, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 413, 433–34
(1990); John McArthur & Stephen V. Marks, Constituent Interest vs. Legislator Ideology: The
Role of Political Opportunity Cost, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 461, 467 (1988); Thomas Stratmann,
Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?,
77 REV. ECON. & STAT. 127, 132–35 (1995); Thomas Stratmann, Can Special Interests Buy
Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation, 45 J.L. & ECON. 345, 368
(2002); Thomas Stratmann, What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects
of Money and Votes, 57 S. ECON. J. 606, 615–17 (1991).
157. For a criticism of the studies that show that interest-group money buys votes, see John
M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 591, 605 (2005).
158. Professor Lowenstein has referred to these different strategies as “legislative
strategies” (vote-buying) and “electoral strategies” (affecting who is elected). Daniel Hays
Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 308 (1989); see also Lillian R. BeVier, Essay, Campaign Finance Reform:
Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1272 (1994)
(distinguishing between electoral and legislative strategies); Note, The Ass atop the Castle:
Competing Strategies for Using Campaign Donations to Influence Lawmaking, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 2610, 2610–11 (2003) (discussing legislative and electoral strategies in the context of
campaign finance laws).
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their votes but by increasing the probability of election for legislators
whose past voting records show that that they share the interest
group’s preferences. The contributions cull the interest group’s
enemies, leaving only friendly legislators.
Thus, regardless of whether judges vote to obtain funds or
interest groups award funds to judges based on their past votes, it is
possible that interest groups may affect case outcomes.
159
Approximately 90 percent of voters and 80 percent of judges are
concerned that with campaign contributions, interest groups are
160
trying to use the courts to shape policy.
Three groups are the most active contributors to judicial
campaigns. In 2004 state supreme court elections, over 60 percent of
contributions came from interest groups that were business groups,
161
labor groups, or lawyers’ organizations. The single largest interest
group contributors were pro-business groups, which contributed 34
162
percent of the total campaign funds raised by candidates.
Although mine is the first analysis to examine the relationship
between interest group contributions and judges’ voting, some recent
studies have examined the relationship between contributions from
individual law firms and case outcomes when those law firms appear
in court. Scholars have found a correlation between the sources of a
judge’s funding and the judge’s rulings in arbitration decisions from
163
the Alabama Supreme Court, in tort cases before state supreme
164
courts in Alabama, Kentucky, and Ohio, in cases between two
165
businesses in the Texas Supreme Court, and in cases during the
166
Supreme Court of Georgia’s 2003 term. Although it might seem

159. GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., supra note 12, at 9.
160. GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., supra note 155, at 9.
161. DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004, at 20
(Jesse Rutledge ed., 2005), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/NewPoliticsReport
2004.pdf.
162. Id.
163. Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics, and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration
Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 661 (1999).
164. Eric N. Waltenburg & Charles S. Lopeman, Tort Decisions and Campaign Dollars, 28
SOUTHEASTERN POL. REV. 241, 255 (2000).
165. Madhavi McCall, The Politics of Judicial Elections: The Influence of Campaign
Contributions on the Voting Patterns of Texas Supreme Court Justices, 1994–1997, 31 POL. &
POL’Y 314, 326, 330 (2003).
166. Damon M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision
Making, 7 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 281, 287–89 (2007).
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shocking that a judge would be permitted to rule in a case in which
167
one of the litigants is a campaign contributor, many states allow this.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF RETENTION POLITICS
ON JUDGES’ VOTING
I now examine empirically the relationship between money,
politics, and impartial justice. If judges routinely adjust their rulings
to attract votes and campaign dollars, my results suggest that the
delicate balance between judicial independence and accountability
has been upset. In this Part, I explore whether judges’ voting is
strongly associated with the preferences of the retention agents. In
Part V, I test the relationship between judges’ voting and campaign
contributions.
To test the influence of fundamental ideology and retention
politics on judges’ voting in state supreme courts, I use data from the
168
State Supreme Court Data Project. The data include more than
21,000 decisions involving more than four hundred individual state
169
supreme court justices. These data include almost all state supreme
170
court cases in all fifty states from 1995 to 1998. The data include
variables that reflect case histories, case participants, legal issues, case
171
outcomes, and individual justices’ behavior. I supplemented these
data in several ways: with institutional variables that describe aspects
of the judicial system of each state, with variables that describe the
political affiliations of various groups and people in each state, and
with detailed information about each judge’s career.
I estimate a multivariate regression equation that measures how
individual judges’ rulings are related both to the political preferences

167. Aman McLeod, If at First You Don’t Succeed: A Critical Evaluation of Judicial
Selection Reform Efforts, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 520 (2005).
168. Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Court Data Project, http://www.ruf.
rice.edu/~pbrace/statecourt/index.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
169. Id.
170. State dockets exceeding two hundred cases in a single year are selected from a random
sample of two hundred cases. Typically, case quantities are unaffected due to the limited size of
many state supreme court dockets. Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, State Judicial Database
Coding Rules (Feb. 1, 1999), http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~pbrace/statecourt/CodingRules.html.
171. Id.
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of the people responsible for their retention and to other
172
characteristics of the state, the judge, and the case.
A. The Model’s Technical Structure
I first introduce the model in symbols, and I provide a brief
outline of the variables. In Section B, I explain the model more fully.
The model is:
(1) Pr ob( FavLitVotei = 1| x) = Φ ( β 0 + β 1 Re tentAgent + β 2 Judge + β 3 Case + β 4 State)
FavLitVote

The probability that the relevant litigant wins in case i

RetentAgent

Includes four indicator variables for whether a vote is
given by a judge facing Republican retention agents in:
a partisan reelection,
a nonpartisan reelection,
an unopposed retention election, or
a gubernatorial reappointment.

Judge

Includes three judge-level variables:
the PAJID measure of judicial ideology,
the number of years the judge has been on the
court,
the number of years until the next retention.

Case

Includes several case-level variables:
in business cases, an indicator variable for the
general industry of the business litigant
when relevant,
in civil cases, an indicator variable for the
general issue in the case,

172. A similar analysis with more detailed econometric explanations can be found in Joanna
Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=997491. In this article, I developed
three hypotheses about the relationship between ideology or political influences, on
the one hand, and judges’ voting, on the other hand: judges’ voting could reflect the
judges’ fundamental ideological beliefs, judges’ voting could reflect the preferences of
the groups responsible for judges’ retention, or selection effects could completely
eliminate political or ideological voting; if potential litigants bargain in the shadow of
politics, then only cases without a clear political or ideological slant would go to trial.
Id. (manuscript at 2). I then tested the hypotheses empirically. Id. Although I found that the
voting of state supreme court judges is strongly associated with the stereotypical preferences of
the retention agents, id. (manuscript at 16), this previous article did not discuss or examine any
relationship between campaign contributions and judges’ voting.
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and, in criminal appeals, indicator variables for
whether the criminal was represented by a
public defender and whether the case was a
murder trial.
State

Includes several state-level variables:
the percentage of years since 1960 that each
state’s legislature was majority Republican,
an indicator variable for whether the state has a
lower appellate court,
and an indicator variable for whether the judges
sit en banc.

B. Details of the Model
Equation (1) measures the relationship between judges’ voting
and the political preferences of retention agents, while controlling for
many other factors that might also affect voting.
1. Dependent Variable. The dependent variable is the probability
that the relevant litigant wins in any given case. I examine six
categories of cases that seem especially likely to reveal divisions
between Republican and Democratic judges: cases between a
business and a person, cases involving labor disputes, medical
173
malpractice cases, products liability cases, tort cases, and criminal
appeals.
Certainly the facts of some of the cases under each category
should produce no distinction between Republican and Democratic
preferences. However, the categories do allow me to measure
whether judges’ voting conforms to general stereotypes about
Republican and Democratic preferences.
The State Supreme Court Data Project coded judges in civil
cases as voting for a litigant if they voted to make the litigant any
better off, regardless of whether they voted to reverse a lower court

173. A decision favoring a tort plaintiff is commonly viewed as a liberal outcome whereas
one favoring the defendant is considered a conservative outcome. See, e.g., Reginald S. Sheehan,
William Mishler & Donald Songer, Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of Direct
Parties Before the Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 464, 464 (1992); Jeff Yates, Holley
Tankersley & Paul Brace, Do Institutions Really Matter? Assessing the Impact of State Judicial
Structures on Citizen Litigiousness 7–8 (Searle Ctr. on Law, Regulation, & Econ. Growth,
Working Paper No. 11, 2007), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/
Brace-Yates_Northwestern_conf.pdf.
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or to change the damage award. The Project coded judges in criminal
cases as voting for the criminal if they voted to overturn all or some
convictions.
2. Retention-Politics Variable. RetentAgent includes the four
primary variables of interest: a variable that indicates if a vote is given
by a judge facing Republican retention agents in a partisan reelection,
a variable that indicates if a judge is facing Republican retention
agents in a nonpartisan reelection, a variable that indicates if a judge
is facing Republican retention agents in an unopposed retention
election, and a variable that indicates if a judge must be reappointed
by a Republican governor.
For some retention methods, the political affiliation of the
retention agents is clear. If judges are subject to reappointment by the
governor, then the political affiliation of the reappointing governor
should influence the voting of judges facing reappointment. Similarly,
the majority party in the legislature should influence the voting of
judges facing legislative reappointment or legislative reelection.
For other methods, however, the political affiliation of the
retention agents is more ambiguous or difficult to determine. For
judges facing reelection, the ideological preferences of the citizens
voting in the reelections should influence how judges vote before the
elections. Because there is no exact measure of the future voters’
preferences, however, I use the political affiliation of the states’
governors as a proxy for the voters’ ideological preferences.
The governors’ party affiliation is the best measure available to
proxy the preferences of voters in judicial elections because the same
pool of voters usually vote for judges as for governors. In the majority
174
of states, judges are elected in statewide elections, as are governors.
175
In contrast, state legislators are typically elected by district. In
addition, voter turnout (in both the number and the type of citizens)
for judicial elections would be more similar to voter turnout in
gubernatorial elections than voter turnout in presidential elections.
Finally, although certain indexes of citizen ideology, such as the Berry
176
measure, are good measures of overall citizen preferences, they may

174. ROTTMAN ET AL., supra note 81, at 25–28 tbl.4.
175. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, State Profile Summary, http://www.senate.mn/
departments/scr/redist/redprof/profiles.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
176. See generally William Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the
American States, 1960–93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327, 329 (1998).
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be weaker proxies for the preferences of voters in judicial elections.
These indexes are composed of several different measures, including
interest group ratings of the members of Congress, election returns
for congressional races, the party composition of state legislatures,
177
and the party affiliation of state governors. Thus, most of the
included measures have little relationship with the preferences of the
voters in judicial elections. Nevertheless, I also check the robustness
of my findings against other proxies for the preferences of voters in
178
judicial elections.
For each judge, the best prediction of the future retention agent’s
party affiliation depends on when the judge will face retention. For
judges that face retention during the current governor’s term, the best
predictor of the party affiliation of the retention agents is the
governor’s current party affiliation. For example, for a judge seeking
retention in 1996 in a state where the governor’s term lasts from
1994–1998, the party affiliation of the governor elected in 1994 is the
best proxy for the political preferences of the people that will reelect
the judge in 1996.
In contrast, for a judge who faces retention after the current
governor’s term, the judge’s prediction is based not only on the
current governor’s party, but also on recent governors’ party
affiliations. That is, the best predictor of the party affiliation of the
future retention agents is the likelihood that the future retention
agents will belong to a given party. For example, for a judge seeking
retention in 2000 in a state where the current governor’s term ends in
1998 and has had two Republican governors out of the last five
governors, the judge’s expected probability of a future Republican
governor—and in turn, future Republican retention agents—is 40
percent.
3. Control Variables. My estimation of Equation (1) will
separate the influence of each factor that is included, allowing me to
distinguish the retention agents’ influence on voting from other
influences. Thus, to determine whether retention politics really
influences voting, it is important to control for as many other factors
177. E.g., id. at 329
178. Moreover, many scholars assert that under partisan elections, judicial selection is
essentially vested with political party leaders and a judge’s nomination by the dominant party
almost always leads to victory. See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, Judicial Politics: Making the Case for
Merit Selection, 68 ALB. L. REV. 713, 718 (2005) (basing the conclusions on numerous exit
surveys and observations from New York City judicial elections).
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as possible to ensure that the results are not caused by something
179
other than retention politics. Ideally, one could quantify and include
any factor related to voting. In practice, researchers include as many
variables as is technically possible given data constraints.
The control variables I include fall into three categories: judgelevel variables, case-level variables, and state-level variables. All of
these should be related to voting. That is, three types of
characteristics may contribute to determining a judge’s vote in a
particular case: the judge’s own characteristics such as the judge’s
fundamental ideology, case characteristics such as the type of
litigants, and state characteristics such as the conservatism of the
state’s laws. Unfortunately, one of the most important influences on a
judge’s voting, the guilt or liability of the parties, is unquantifiable
and, therefore, not included as a control variable. Nevertheless, the
variables that I do include will pick up the marginal influence of these
other factors on judges’ voting.
The variables in Judge control for judge-specific characteristics
that may be related to judges’ voting. First, it includes a measure of
the fundamental ideology of each judge. For this proxy, I use each
judge’s party-adjusted surrogate judge ideology measure, or PAJID
score. This is the most common measure of judges’ ideology used in
political science studies and is based on the assumption that judges’
ideologies can be best proxied by both their partisan affiliation and
the ideology of their states at the time of their initial accession to
180
office. Including the PAJID scores allows me to separate the
influence of the judges’ own ideology from the influence of retention
agents. I also include both a variable indicating the length of time in
years that the individual judge has served on the court and a variable
indicating the length of time in years until the judge’s next retention.
These variables control for voting changes throughout a judge’s
181
career and term.
The variables in Case control for case-level factors that may be
related to judges’ voting. I include a series of dummy variables
179. That is, if a third, omitted variable has significant influence on voting, and that omitted
variable is strongly correlated with retention politics, my analysis may erroneously attribute to
the retention agent variable the relationship between voting and the omitted third variable.
180. Paul Brace, Laura Langer & Melinda Gann Hall, Measuring the Preferences of State
Supreme Court Judges, 62 J. POL. 387, 393–94 (2000).
181. Interactions that include the time until retention are generally insignificant, most likely
because the short period of my sample permits little variation in the time until retention for
each year.
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indicating the general industry of the business litigant (agriculture,
construction, financial services, manufacturing, mining, service, trade,
transportation, or utilities) in the estimations of cases between a
business and an individual, employer litigants in labor disputes,
business litigants in products liability cases, and litigants who were the
original defendants in tort cases. In addition, all of the estimations for
civil cases include a series of indicator variables signifying the general
issue in the case (domestic relations, estates, contracts, or torts). The
estimations based on criminal appeals include an indicator variable
for whether the criminal was represented by a public defender and a
variable indicating whether the case was a murder trial.
The variables in State control for state-level characteristics that
may be related to case outcomes. First, State includes the percentage
of years since 1960 that each state’s legislature had a Republican
majority. I use this variable as a proxy for the conservatism of the
states’ laws. Because states with conservative laws may also be more
likely to have Republican retention agents, this control allows me to
isolate the influence of Republican retention agents from judges
simply applying conservative laws in conservative states.
In State I also include variables that indicate whether the states’
supreme courts have discretion to grant review (that is, whether they
have a lower appellate court) and whether the judges sit en banc.
Both of these variables may be relevant to the types of cases that
supreme courts here and, in turn, to the judges’ voting. When
supreme courts have discretion to grant review, the litigants do not
alone control which appeals are heard. Thirty-nine states have lower
appellate courts, and those states’ supreme courts have discretionary
182
review. In these courts, the judges may choose to hear cases that
183
give them opportunities to exercise their ideological preferences.
Whether the supreme courts sit en banc may also influence the
types of cases the courts hear. The supreme courts of Alabama,
Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Virginia, and Washington
often do not sit en banc; instead, various subsets of the judges hear
182. STRICKLAND ET AL., supra note 133, at 12–67.
183. Conceivably, litigants could decide to settle after review of their case has been granted;
the granting of review may be a signal that the court plans to vote ideologically. However, in a
study of civil appeals in forty-six large counties between 2001 and 2005, no litigants withdrew
their cases after the courts of last resort granted review. THOMAS H. COHEN, APPEALS FROM
GENERAL CIVIL TRIALS IN 46 LARGE COUNTIES, 2001–2005, at 9 (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Bulletin No. NCJ 212979, 2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/agctlc05.pdf.
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184

each case. The supreme courts of other states may periodically not
sit en banc, if, for example, there is a conflict with a particular judge.
If the ideologies of the judges on a specific court differ, and the
litigants do not know which judges will hear their case because the
court does not sit en banc, then the litigants cannot, when making
settlement decisions, fully consider the court’s ideology. In some
cases, litigants may not settle cases that they would have settled had
they known in advance their judges’ identities.
185
As is standard and appropriate in such analysis, the equation
186
also includes a set of time dummy variables that capture national
trends and influences that affect all judges but vary over time. The
variables correct for the possibility that a change in voting may be
due, not to retention politics, but to factors that affect all judges, such
187
as trends in conservatism or changes in national laws.
4. Estimation Method. Equation (1) is estimated with a
maximum likelihood probit model. I present the marginal effects of
each retention method–political party variable on the probability of a
judge voting for the relevant litigant. The results tables report the
increase in the probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigant
under the particular retention method–political party combination,
holding the case’s other characteristics constant.
The base category in all estimations, when all four retention
agent variables are zero, consists of votes by judges facing Democratic
retention agents in any retention method and votes by judges with
188
permanent tenure. Thus, because of the small number of judges
with permanent tenure, every result for judges facing Republican
retention agents is almost the mirror image of the findings for judges
facing Democratic retention agents. That is, if I find that judges facing
Republican retention agents are 20 percent more likely to vote for a
particular litigant, then one can infer that judges facing Democratic

184. STRICKLAND ET AL., supra note 133, at 16–67.
185. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 116–18 (5th ed. 2003)
(explaining the use of dummy variables in regression analysis).
186. A dummy variable is a yes-no indicator with only two possible values, 0 and 1.
187. I am unable to include state-level and judge-level fixed effects because most are
perfectly collinear with the retention variables, many of which do not change during the fouryear sample period.
188. For the four states with retention by legislative election or appointment, the retention
agents are Democratic throughout my sample.
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retention agents are approximately 20 percent less likely to vote for
the same litigant.
In addition, the t-statistics are computed from standard errors
clustered by case to correct for possible clustering effects. Clustering
effects refers to the fact that observations may be independent across
189
groups (clusters), but not necessarily within groups. Thus, the
standard errors from observations from within the same case may be
relatively small when compared to standard errors from observations
from other cases. Not controlling for possible clustering effects could
artificially inflate my t-statistics, producing results that incorrectly
appear to be statistically significant.
C. Primary Empirical Results
The results support the hypothesis that, under some retention
methods, judges’ voting is influenced by the political preferences of
retention agents. The table in the Appendix reports the full results for
all variables. The table indicates the relationship between judges’
voting, on one hand, and the retention agent variables and control
variables, on the other. In the table, the top number in each cell is the
regression coefficient, which indicates for each variable the
magnitude and direction of the relationship with judges’ votes. A
negative coefficient indicates that a variable reduces the probability
that a judge will vote for the Republican-favored litigant. In contrast,
a positive coefficient indicates that a variable increases the
probability that a judge will vote for the Republican-favored litigant.
In addition, the table reports the t-statistic for each coefficient. In
each cell, the t-statistic is the bottom number in parentheses.
Coefficients with t-statistics equal to or greater than 1.645 are
considered statistically significant at the 10 percent level, meaning
that there is 90 percent certainty that the coefficient is different from
zero. T-statistics equal to or greater than 1.96 indicate statistical
significance at the more-certain 5 percent level, and t-statistics equal
to or greater than 2.576 indicate statistical significance at the mostcertain 1 percent level. Empiricists typically require t-statistics of at
least 1.645 to conclude that one variable affects another in the
190
direction indicated by the coefficient. In the table, “*” and “+”
189. HALBERT WHITE, ASYMPTOTIC THEORY FOR ECONOMETRICIANS 135–36 (1984).
190. For each regression, the table also reports R-squared statistics. In contrast to the
t-statistics, which measure the reliability of each individual coefficient, the R-squared measures
the regression’s overall goodness of fit. GREENE, supra note 185, at 33–36. That is, the
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indicate significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
Table 3 reproduces from the Appendix the coefficients and
t-statistics for the retention agent variables. The results indicate that
when judges face Republican retention agents in partisan reelections,
they are more likely to vote for businesses over individuals, for
employers in labor disputes, for doctors and hospitals in medical
malpractice cases, for businesses in products liability cases, for
original defendants in tort cases, and against criminals in criminal
191
appeals. The magnitudes of the marginal effects are substantial but
reasonable. For example, the results suggest that a judge facing a
partisan reelection during the current term of a Republican governor,
compared to the base categories, is approximately 36 percentage
192
points more likely to vote in favor of businesses over individuals.
Table 3. Political Influences on Judicial Voting under Different
193
Retention Methods
Republican/
Republican/

Republican/

Retention

Republican/

Litigant

Partisan

Nonpartisan

Election

Reappoint

Business Vote in

0.364*

0.05+

.035

0.041

Business v. Person

(7.89)

(1.65)

(1.39)

(0.58)

Employer Vote in

0.359*

0.042

0.030

-0.204

Labor Dispute

(2.91)

(0.69)

(0.57)

(1.32)

R-squared measures how much of the overall variation in the dependent variable, here the
probability of voting for the Republican-favored litigant, is explained by the explanatory
variables. Id. at 33. Thus, the R-squared of a regression will vary between 0 and 1. Id. An
R-squared of 0 means that the explanatory variables explain none of the dependant variable’s
variation. Id. An R-squared of 1 means that the explanatory variables explain all of the
variation. Id. The closer the R-squared is to 1, the better the regression explains the data. Id.
191. My unreported estimations confirm that the near mirror image applies for judges facing
Democratic retention agents.
192. For brevity, I do not report the coefficients for all of the control variables, most of
which are statistically insignificant. The coefficients on both the years to retention and the
percentage of years since 1960 that each state’s legislature was majority Republican are positive
and significant for most of the cases.
193. The table reports the marginal effects of each retention method/political party variable
on the probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The
other control variables are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. “*”
and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Doctor/Hospital

0.308*

-0.021

0.10

-0.251

Vote in Medmal Case

(2.57)

(0.22)

(1.16)

(0.95)

Business Vote in

0.444*

0.077

0.004

0.607+

Products Liability Case

(3.09)

(0.78)

(0.04)

(1.76)

Original Defendant

0.418*

0.048

0.067*

0.096

Vote in Tort Case

(8.90)

(1.59)

(2.70)

(0.94)

Vote to Overturn

-0.076+

0.002

0.026

-0.03

Criminal Conviction

(1.90)

(0.10)

(1.41)

(0.39)

The results are much weaker for the other retention methods.
Judges facing Republican retention agents in nonpartisan reelections
are more likely to favor the Republican-favored litigant only in cases
between businesses and individuals. Judges facing Republican
retention agents in unopposed retention elections are more likely to
favor the Republican-favored litigant only in tort cases. Finally,
judges facing reappointment by a Republican governor are more
likely to vote for businesses only in products liability cases.
The stronger results in both significance and magnitude for
judges facing partisan elections are consistent with recent trends in
these elections; partisan elections are much more likely to be
contested and incumbents are significantly more likely to lose in the
reelections. It appears that, to keep their jobs, judges in partisan
election systems must appeal more to their retention agents than
judges under other systems.
D. Influences on Judges Not Facing Retention
Next, I test whether the same political ideologies that are shown
to influence judicial voting when judges face retention also influence
the behavior of judges that do not face retention. If they do, then this
would suggest that judges generally respond to public sentiment; that
is, the results would suggest that all judges, whether subject to
retention or not, attempt to conform their own judicial approach to
public preferences. In contrast, if there is a difference between judges
that do and do not face retention, then this would suggest that
retention politics are an important influence on judges facing
retention.
First, I test whether the party affiliations of the groups found to
influence nontenured judges—governors and legislatures—also
influence judges with permanent tenure. The results, which are
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reported in Table 4, show that tenured judges respond less to the
electorate’s will than do nontenured ones. Indeed, tenured judges in
states with Republican legislatures and Republican governors are not
any more likely to vote in favor of Republican-favored litigants. In
fact, tenured judges in states with Republican legislatures are more
likely to vote to overturn a criminal conviction on appeal, the
opposite of their untenured counterparts.
Table 4. The Impact of Gubernatorial and Legislative Party
194
Affiliations on Judges with Permanent Tenure

Litigant

Majority
Republican
Legislature

Republican
Governor

Business Vote in
Business v. Person

-0.08
(1.04)

0.065
(0.51)

2164

Employer Vote
in Labor Dispute

0.005
(0.03)

-0.28
(0.95)

382

Doctor/Hospital Vote
in Medmal Case

0.163
(0.59)

Business Vote in
Products Liability Case

0.03
(0.10)

-0.072
(0.14)

152

Original Defendant
Vote in Tort Case

-0.040
(0.46)

-0.140
(0.98)

1719

Vote to Overturn
Criminal Conviction

0.173*
(2.51)

-0.099
(1.04)

3512

# of
Observations

146

Next, I test whether judges vote differently in their last term
before retirement than they do when facing retention. Thirty-seven
states have mandatory retirement laws that compel judges to retire
194. The table reports the marginal effects of each retention method/political party variable
on the probability of the relevant litigants’ receiving a vote, based on probit estimates. The
estimation is limited to the sample of states where judges are given life tenure or serve until age
70: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island. See table accompanying note 81.
In Rhode Island, judges have life tenure, see supra note 85; in Massachusetts and New
Hampshire, judges serve until age 70, see supra notes 82, 86; in New Jersey, after an initial
gubernatorial reappointment, judges serve until age 70, N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, ¶ 6 (all of the
New Jersey judges were already reappointed) The other control variables are not reported for
brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5
percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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sometime between age seventy and seventy-five. By examining the
voting of judges in their last term before mandatory retirement, I can
test whether the same differences in voting that exist between judges
facing Republican and Democratic retention agents also exist when
judges are immune from retention politics.
Table 5 reports the results. It appears that judges in their last
term before mandatory retirement respond less to political forces
than other judges. The results suggest that, for most categories of
cases, there is no significant difference in voting between retiring
judges that would have faced Republican retention agents (if they had
not retired) and retiring judges that would have faced Democratic
retention agents. Only in tort cases in states with partisan reelections
and retention elections do judges that would have faced Republican
retention agents vote for the Republican-favored litigant. In contrast,
judges that would have faced Republican retention agents in states
with partisan reelections are more likely, not less likely, to vote to
overturn a criminal conviction.
Table 5. Influences on Judges in the Last Term before Mandatory
195
Retirement
Republican/

# of

Republican/

Republican/

Retention

Republican/

Observ-

Litigant

Partisan

Nonpartisan

Election

Reappoint

ations

Business Vote in

0.175

-0.089

.044

0.071

3018

Business v. Person

(1.57)

(1.52)

(0.86)

(1.02)

Employer Vote

0.153

-0.099

0.167

-0.022

in Labor Dispute

(0.59)

(0.78)

(1.62)

(0.12)

Doctor/Hosp Vote

0.324

-0.078

0.159

-0.613

in Medmal Case

(0.94)

(0.31)

(0.83)

(1.25)

Business vote in

0.321

-0.098

0.160

1.14

Prod. Liab. Case

(0.84)

(0.44)

(0.78)

(1.32)

610

268

189

195. The table reports the marginal effects of each retention method/political party variable
on the probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The
estimation is limited to the sample of judges in their last term of office before mandatory
retirement. The other control variables are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in
parentheses. “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
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Orig. Defendant

0.284*

0.010

0.111*

0.066

Vote in Tort Case

(2.69)

(0.16)

(2.13)

(0.75)

Vote to Overturn

0.23*

-0.052

0.008

-0.047

Crim. Conviction

(5.34)

(1.17)

(0.23)

(1.19)

665
2615

5027

The results from Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the political
preferences of retention agents have little influence on judges that do
not face pressure from retention politics because they either have life
tenure or are in their last term in office. These results suggest that, in
contrast to judges not facing retention, public sentiment is an
important influence on judges facing retention.
E. Effect of Changes in Retention Agents’ Preferences
As a further test of the importance of political pressure on
judges, I examine if judges’ voting changes when a new governor from
a different political party is elected. If the political affiliation of the
current governor is an indicator of the preferences of retention
agents, judges may take the election of a new governor from a
different political party as a signal that the political preferences of
retention agents have changed. During my sample, the governors
changed parties in three states where judges face retention:
196
197
198
Arkansas, Louisiana, and West Virginia. Judges in these three
199
states must be retained in partisan elections. I examine the votes of
only judges that were present both before and after the change of
governors to ensure that the results are not just capturing the voting
of new judges that were selected for the supreme court after the
regime change.
Table 6 reports the results. The results show that when a
Republican governor replaces a Democratic governor, judges are
more likely to vote in favor of the business in a business-versusperson case, in favor of the employer in a labor dispute, and in favor
of the original defendant in a tort case. This evidence provides

196. See Frank Wolfe & Elizabeth Caldwell, Mansion Ready? Huckabee on Doorstep, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, July 15, 1996, at A1.
197. See Jack Wardlaw, Changing of the Guard, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 9,
1996, at A1.
198. See Fanny Seller, House Ready to Take Lead, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 9, 1997, at
A1.
199. STRICKLAND ET AL., supra note 133, at 19, 34, 65.
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support for the hypothesis that judges have their fingers to the wind;
their voting appears to change immediately following a change in
retention agents’ preferences, as proxied by the governor’s party
affiliation.
Table 6: Impact of Changes in Political Influences on
200
Judicial Voting

Litigant

Republican
Retention
Agent

Business Vote in
Business v. Person

0.10+
(1.77)

918

Employer Vote in
Labor Dispute

0.284*
(2.13)

186

Doctor/Hospital Vote
in Medmal Case

-0.26
(1.31)

105

Business Vote in
Prod. Liability Case

-0.407
(1.58)

48

Original Defendant
Vote in Tort Case

0.135+
(1.88)

825

Vote to Overturn
Criminal Conviction

-0.010
(0.24)

1484

# of
Observa
-tions

V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS ON JUDGES’ VOTING
In this Part, I examine the relationship between campaign money
and impartial justice. That is, I explore whether judges adjust their
rulings to attract campaign contributions from interest groups.

200. The table reports the marginal effects of a variable indicating a Republican party
affiliation in states where the party affiliation of the people responsible for retention changes.
Thus, the marginal effects show the change in the likelihood of a judge voting for the relevant
litigants when the party affiliation of the retention agent changes from Democrat to Republican.
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent and
10 percent levels, respectively.
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A. Empirical Model
I estimate a model similar to the model in Part IV:
(2) Pr ob( FavLitVotei = 1|x)= Φ ( β0 + β1 RetentAgent + β2 Judge+ β3 Case+ β4 State+ β5 IGContrib)
All of the variables in Judge, Case, and State are the same as in
Equation (1). Because large fundraising occurs only under systems
using partisan and nonpartisan elections, I limit my sample to judges
elected under these systems. Thus, the variable RetentAgent now
includes only two variables: a variable that indicates if a vote is given
by a judge facing Republican retention agents in a partisan reelection,
and a variable that indicates if a judge is facing Republican retention
agents in a nonpartisan reelection. By including these variables, I can
separate the influence of campaign contributions on voting from the
influence of retention politics more generally. That is, although I
demonstrated in Part IV that judges facing Republican retention
agents in partisan elections are more likely to vote for the
Republican-favored litigant, I can now explore whether campaign
contributions have an additional, yet separate, effect on judges’
voting.
The new variable IGContrib includes the total dollar amount of
campaign contributions from various interest groups in the judges’
201
most recent elections. I explore the relationship between judges’
voting and campaign contributions from five categories of interest
groups that might have a stake in the particular type of case before
the supreme court. First, I explore the relationship between the
campaign contributions from pro-business groups and judges’ voting
for the business appellant in business-versus-person cases, for the
business in products liability cases, and for the original defendant in
tort cases (original defendants are often businesses). If judges’ rulings
favor pro-business interest groups that contributed to their previous
campaigns, then one would expect to see a positive relationship
201. The data on campaign contributions comes from Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics,
Follow the Money, http://www.followthemoney.org/index.phtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). The
nonpartisan, nonprofit charitable organization is dedicated to accurate, comprehensive, and
unbiased documentation and research on campaign finance at the state level. Nat’l Inst. on
Money in State Politics, Mission & History, http://www.followthemoney.org/Institute/
index.phtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). “The Institute receives its data in either electronic or
paper files from the state disclosure agencies with which candidates must file their campaign
finance reports. The Institute collects the information for all state-level candidates in the
primary and general elections and then puts it into a database.” Nat’l Inst. on Money in State
Politics, About Our Data, http://www.followthemoney.org/Institute/about_data.phtml (last
visited Nov. 3, 2008).
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between previous pro-business campaign contributions and the
likelihood that judges vote for the business litigant.
Second, I explore the relationship between the campaign
contributions from pro-labor groups and judges’ voting for the
employer in labor disputes. If campaign contributions make judges
more sympathetic to pro-labor groups, then one would expect a
negative relationship between pro-labor contributions and the
likelihood that judges would vote for employers in labor disputes.
Third, I estimate the relationship between the campaign
contributions from doctor and hospital groups and judges’ voting for
the doctor or hospital in medical malpractice cases or general tort
cases. One would expect a positive relationship between these
contributions and the likelihood of judges’ voting for doctors or
hospitals if campaign contributions have an effect.
Fourth, I estimate the relationship between campaign
contributions from insurance companies and judges’ voting for
litigants that were originally defendants; I assume that a relatively
high proportion of litigants that were originally defendants are
insured. I test the relationship between insurance contributions and
judges’ voting for the business in business-versus-person cases, for the
doctor or hospital in medical malpractice cases, for the business in
products liability cases, and for the original defendant in tort cases. If
campaign contributions from insurance companies influence judges’
voting, one would expect them to vote more favorably for the insured
litigants.
Finally, I estimate the relationship between judges’ voting and
campaign contributions from lawyer groups. The majority of the
202
lawyer groups are pro-plaintiff groups. Thus, one might expect these
contributions to have the opposite influence from the insurance
contributions. That is, one expects that lawyer contributions will
negatively influence the likelihood that judges will vote for the
business in business-versus-person cases, for the doctor or hospital in
medical malpractice cases, for the business in products liability cases,
and for the original defendant in tort cases.
Again, I include a set of time dummy variables that capture
national trends that might influence judges’ voting, such as trends in
conservatism or changes in national legislation.

202. See, e.g., GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 161, at 23 (discussing battles between probusiness groups and lawyer groups, and the resulting campaign contributions).
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Like the previous retention estimations, I estimate Equation (2)
with a maximum likelihood probit model. I present the marginal
effects of each interest group’s campaign contributions on the
probability that a judge will vote for the relevant litigant. The results
report the increase in the probability that a judge will vote for the
relevant litigant for a $1,000 increase in each interest groups’
campaign contribution, holding the case’s other characteristics
constant.
As before, the t-statistics are computed from standard errors
clustered by case to correct for any possible clustering effect.
B. Primary Empirical Results
The results show that there is a strong relationship between
campaign contributions and judges’ voting. Table 7 shows that for
judges elected in partisan elections, contributions from various
interest groups have a statistically significant relationship with the
probability that judges vote for litigants that the interest groups favor.
The results show that contributions from pro-business groups
increase the probability that judges will vote for the business litigant
in a business-versus-person case, for the business litigant in a products
liability case, and for the original defendant (which is often a
business) in tort cases.
Contributions from pro-labor groups reduce the probability that
judges vote for the employers in labor disputes. Contributions from
doctor and hospital groups increase the probability that judges vote
for original defendants (which are often doctors and hospitals) in tort
cases.
Contributions from insurance companies increase the probability
that judges will vote for parties that typically carry insurance:
businesses in business-versus-person cases, businesses in products
liability cases, and original defendants in tort cases.
In contrast, contributions from lawyers, most of which are
plaintiffs’ lawyers, reduce the probability that judges will vote for
litigants that are typically defendants: businesses in business-versusperson cases, businesses in products liability cases, and original
defendants in tort cases.
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Table 7. Influence of Campaign Contributions in
203
Partisan-Election Systems
Contributions from Interest Groups

Litigant

ProBusiness
Groups

Business Vote in
Business v. Person

0.024*
(2.59)

Employer Vote in
Labor Dispute

ProLabor
Groups

Doctors
& Hospitals

Insurance
Companies

Lawyer
Groups

0.40*
(6.83)

-0.02*
(4.10)

0.34
(1.41)

-0.02
(1.63)

0.69*
(3.14)

-0.05*
(3.23)

0.35*
(5.59)

-0.02*
(3.79)

-1.23*
(2.37)

Doctor/Hosp. Vote
in Medmal Case

0.17
(1.55)

Business Vote in
Prod. Liability Case

0.18*
(3.25)

Original Defendant
Vote in Tort Case

0.021+
(1.89)

0.14*
(5.37)

The magnitudes of the coefficients show the average percentage
increase in the probability of a judge voting for a relevant litigant for
each $1,000 contribution from a special interest group. The
magnitudes are significant, but reasonable. For example, the results
suggest that for every $1,000 contribution from insurance companies,
judges are, on average, 0.4 percent more likely to vote for business
litigants in business-versus-person cases, 0.69 percent more likely to
vote for businesses in products liability cases, and 0.35 percent more
likely to vote for the original defendants in tort cases.
The results show that the impact of large contributions can be
important. For example, a $100,000 contribution would increase the
average probability that a judge would vote for a business in a
products liability case by 69 percent. These results comport with

203. The table reports the marginal effects of each groups’ campaign contributions on the
probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The
magnitudes of the coefficients show the average percentage increase in the probability of a
judge voting for a relevant litigant for each $1,000 contribution from a special interest group.
The other control variables are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
“*” and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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earlier findings that judges’ votes favor specific litigants who earlier
204
made contributions to the judges.
Table 8 reports the results for judges elected in nonpartisan
systems. Some of the results are statistically insignificant, indicating
that campaign contributions have a weaker relationship with judges’
voting in nonpartisan systems. Yet there are still several significant
relationships.
Contributions from pro-business groups increase the probability
that a judge will vote for the original defendant in tort cases.
Contributions from pro-labor groups decrease the probability that
judges will vote for employers in labor disputes. Contributions from
doctor and hospital groups increase the probability that judges vote
for doctors or hospitals in medical malpractice cases and for original
defendants (which are often doctors and hospitals) in tort cases.
Contributions from insurance companies increase the probability that
judges will vote for businesses in business-versus-person cases and
original defendants in tort cases. In contrast, contributions from
lawyers reduce the probability that judges will vote for businesses in
business-versus-person cases and original defendants in tort cases.
Table 8. Influence of Campaign Contributions in
205
Nonpartisan-Election Systems
Contributions from Interest Groups
Pro-

Pro-

Doctors

Business

Labor

& Hosp-

Insurance

Lawyer

Litigant

Groups

Groups

itals

Companies

Groups

Business Vote in

0.17

1.13*

-0.16*

Business v. Person

(1.23)

(3.85)

(5.83)

Employer Vote in

-0.33*

Labor Dispute

(4.45)

204. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
205. The table reports the marginal effects of each groups’ campaign contributions on the
probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The
magnitudes of the coefficients show the average percentage increase in the probability of a
judge voting for a relevant litigant for each $1,000 contribution from a special interest group.
The other control variables are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
“*” and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Doctor/Hospitals Vote

1.42+

1.02

-0.06

in Medmal Case

(1.76)

(0.94)

(0.58)

Business Vote in

0.63

1.29

-0.14

Prod. Liability Case

(1.14)

(1.06)

(1.48)

Original Defendant

0.26*

0.71*

0.868*

-0.16*

Vote in Tort Case

(2.04)

(4.90)

(2.81)

(5.12)

Thus, Tables 7 and 8 show that there is a strong relationship
between interest group campaign contribution and judges’ voting.
The relationships are generally stronger for judges elected in partisan
elections. Campaign contributions from many interest groups
influence judges’ voting under both systems, however.
C. Results for Judges Not Facing Reelection
Although the results from Tables 7 and 8 reveal a strong
relationship between interest group campaign contributions and
judges’ voting, they do not reveal which way the causality runs. That
is, they do not show whether campaign contributions persuade judges
to vote in certain ways or whether interest groups contribute to the
campaigns of those judges whose votes are consistent with the interest
groups’ preferences. Under both of these possibilities, interest
contributions influence state supreme court rulings. The influence can
be direct, by influencing judges to change their votes. Or the
influence on case outcomes can be indirect, by increasing the
probability that a judge whose votes favor an interest group will be
elected.
However, as an additional test of the degree to which campaign
contributions persuade judges to vote in certain ways, I estimate the
relationship between contributions and voting for retiring judges. I
examine the voting of judges in their last term before mandatory
retirement to test whether contributions have the same relationship
with voting on judges who will not be seeking reelection, and thus will
not solicit campaign contributions in the future. If contributions have
a weaker relationship with the voting of retiring judges, then this
suggests that some of the relationship between contributions and
voting can be explained by judges’ voting in a way that will likely
increase the future contributions from interest groups at the time of
their next reelection campaign. That is, a weaker relationship for
retiring than nonretiring judges would suggest that an interest group’s
campaign contributions can convince judges to change their rulings,
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rather than just increasing the probability of election of judges whose
rulings happen to favor the interest group.
I reestimate Equation (2), but this time I include an interaction
variable that shows the interaction between interest group
contributions and an indicator for whether a judge is retiring. By
including this variable, I am able to measure separately the
relationship between contributions and voting for nonretiring judges
and retiring judges. The results for judges elected in partisan elections
are reported in Table 9; the top panel reports the results for judges
that are not retiring, and the bottom panel shows the results for
judges that are retiring. The results show that fewer of the
contribution variables have a statistically significant relationship with
the voting of retiring judges. Although this could be caused by a
smaller number of observations for retiring judges, it does show that
most interest group contributions have no systematic relationship
with the voting of retiring judges.
Table 9. Differences in the Influence of Campaign Contributions on
206
Nonretiring Judges versus Retiring Judges

Litigant

ProBusiness
Groups

ProLabor
Groups

Doctors
& Hospitals

Insurance
Companies

Lawyer
Groups

0.49*
(7.05)

-0.04*
(5.48)

0.59+
(1.82)

-0.01
(0.61)

Nonretiring Judges
Business Vote in
Business v. Person
Employer Vote in
Labor Dispute
Doctor/Hospitals Vote
in Medmal Case

0.027*
(2.97)
-1.0+
(1.67)
0.18
(1.41)

206. The table reports the marginal effects of each groups’ campaign contributions on the
probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The
magnitudes of the coefficients show the average percentage increase in the probability of a
judge voting for a relevant litigant for each $1,000 contribution from a special interest group.
The estimations reported in the top panel are limited to the sample of judges not in their last
term before mandatory retirement; the estimations reported in the bottom panel are limited to
the sample of judges in their last term of office before mandatory retirement. The other control
variables are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. “*” and “+”
represent significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Business Vote in
Product Liability Case

0.24+
(1.88)

Original Defendant
Vote in Tort Case

0.023*
(2.20)

0.14*
(5.32)

[Vol. 58:623
1.27*
(3.63)

-0.08*
(2.51)

0.51*
(6.41)

-0.03*
(3.83)

-4.8*
(2.55)

-0.6*
(4.37)

-7.5
(0.98)

-0.5
(0.95)

-22.2*
(2.74)

-1.1+
(1.90)

-6.7*
(3.31)

-0.5*
(3.12)

Retiring Judges
Business Vote in
Business v. Person

0.35
(1.94)+

Employer Vote in
Labor Dispute

-4.6
(0.77)

Doctor/Hospitals Vote
in Medmal Case

-0.08
(0.01)

Business Vote in
Product Liability Case

-0.50
(0.62)

Original Defendant
Vote in Tort Case

0.24
(1.21)

-0.13
(0.39)

The negative and statistically significant coefficients on
contributions from insurance companies and lawyer groups indicate
that retiring judges that received contributions from these groups in
the most recent election are even less likely to vote for certain
Republican-favored litigants than they would have been if they were
not retiring. For brevity, I do not report the results for judges elected
in nonpartisan elections, but they show almost no systematic
relationship between any interest group’s contributions and judges’
voting.
These results suggest that the strong relationship shown in Part V
between campaign contributions and how nonretiring judges vote is
due, at least in part, to campaign contributions causing the judges to
change their votes. That is, if the relationship was due merely to the
campaign contributions permitting the election of a higher proportion
of judges who naturally already vote the way that the interest groups
prefer, then campaign contributions should have the same
relationship with the voting of all judges, whether retiring or not.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Supporters of the independence model, adopted in federal
courts, view almost complete independence as optimal. In contrast,
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supporters of the accountability model have suggested that modest
pressure from judicial elections is beneficial. Increasingly contentious
elections and high campaign spending in some states may have placed
judges under such strong political pressure that the important balance
between judicial accountability and independence may be at risk. The
following changes might help to maintain balance in the
accountability model.
A. Permanent Tenure and Maintaining Accountability
The most extreme reform that would increase judicial
independence in state supreme courts would be to grant permanent
tenure to state judges. Like federal judges, state judges would not
have to seek retention and they could serve for life or until some
mandatory retirement age.
Systems with permanent tenure would not completely sacrifice
accountability for independence. Indeed, an extensive literature on
federal judges argues that these judges are accountable to the degree
that they are concerned with improving their reputation, being cited
by their peers, being promoted, minimizing future reversals, and
207
reducing the possibility of political retribution. Similarly, foreign
court systems that give permanent tenure to their judges maintain
judicial accountability through various methods. Examples are the
powers that governments sometimes wield to control judges’
promotions, the ability to grant permanent appointments after
probationary appointments, the power over judicial transfers, the
power over judicial salaries and budgets, and the ability of the
legislature or executive to fire disfavored judges. Although many
sources of pressure exist, I limit my discussion to the major sources:
those that threaten a substantial influence on a judge’s career.

207. For surveys of the literature on motivations of judicial behavior, see generally
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008); Gilat Levy, Careerist Judges, 36 RAND J.
ECON. 275 (2005); Hugo Mialon, Paul Rubin & Joel Schrag, Judicial Hierarchies and the
Rule-Individual Tradeoff (Emory Law & Economics Research Paper No. 05-5, 2004), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=637564.
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a. Promotion Procedures. The agents responsible for deciding
whether a judge is promoted—the promotion agents—may exert
pressure. If judges are promoted to higher courts based on their
records, then they may decide to create records consistent with a
promotion agent’s ideology.
For example, the appointments and promotion process in
Germany, and formerly in Britain, creates incentives for both judges
and those who seek appointment to the bench to shape their records
to the promoting agent’s political orientation.
Until 2005, top-level judges in England were, in effect, appointed
and promoted by the lord chancellor, a political appointee and
cabinet member: although judges were, technically, appointed by
either the queen (high court judges) or the prime minister (court of
appeal judges and house of lords judges), the queen and prime
208
minister in practice followed the lord chancellor’s advice. Because
of the lord chancellor’s effective power, critics argued that judges
209
were often selected based on political patronage instead of merit.
An empirical study of decisions by Court of Appeal judges from 1951
to 1986, however, found no evidence that judges’ records were a
210
factor in their promotion to the House of Lords.
Nevertheless, in response to these and other criticisms, the
211
Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 removed the lord chancellor’s
unfettered appointment and promotion powers and vested many of
212
them in a new Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC).
Following this reform, British judges are selected and promoted by
this independent body of fifteen commissioners drawn from the
judiciary, the legal professions, tribunals, the lay magistracy, and the
213
lay public. The Reform Act requires the commission to select

208. See Kate Malleson, The New Judicial Appointments Commission in England and Wales:
New Wine in New Bottles?, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER 39, 40–42
(Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006); Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the
Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 349, 353–54 (1993).
209. See Malleson supra note 208, at 41 (indicating that it was “increasingly difficult to
sustain” the idea that judges were selected “on the basis of merit rather than political
patronage”).
210. Salzberger, supra note 208, at 354–56.
211. Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (Eng.).
212. Id. c. 4, § 61 (creating JAC); id. c. 4, §§ 63–107 (detailing the role of JAC for different
levels of courts); see also Malleson, supra note 208, at 39–41 (indicating that the creation of the
JAC “significantly reduced the role of the executive in the selection process”).
213. Malleson, supra note 208, at 48.
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candidates solely on merit and to then make recommendations to the
lord chancellor, who can reject the recommendations only after
214
providing reasons.
In Germany, two of the highest courts, the Federal
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) and the Federal
Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), have a process for
215
appointments and promotions that is substantially political. Judges
on the Constitutional Court are “selected by a . . . small group of
leading members of political parties . . . [in] the Bundestag and . . . the
216
second chamber of the Bundesrat.”
Although commentators
suggest that judges are more likely to be promoted when their records
“mirror . . . the political orientation of the . . . government[al body]
217
choosing them,” there is a high degree of continuity on the court;
218
political parties typically retain “their” chair in the court.
Similarly, the judges of the Federal Court of Justice are selected
by the Committee for the Selection of Judges and appointed by the
219
President of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Committee is
composed of the ministers of justice of the sixteen federal states and
sixteen additional members who are selected by the German Federal
220
Parliament. Although the Committee typically seeks proportional
221
representation of the political parties in the court, scholars agree
that the process of selecting judges is a political process in which
judges are selected based at least in part on their judicial decisions’
222
political orientation.
Similar promotion procedures may create political pressure on
lower court judges in other countries. In Australia, the

214. Judicial Appointments Comm’n, Step-by-Step Guide to Processes, http://www.
judicialappointments.gov.uk/select/step.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
215. Christine Landfried, The Selection Process of Constitutional Court Judges in Germany,
in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 208, at 196, 197, 202.
216. Id. at 197.
217. See, e.g., id.
218. Id. at 202.
219. Russell A. Miller & Peer C. Zumbansen, Judicial Selection Controversy at the Federal
Court of Justice, 2 GERMAN L.J. art. 8, ¶ 15 (2001), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.
php?id=69.
220. Id. ¶ 4.
221. Id. ¶ 17.
222. See id. ¶ 22 (“[O]ne can do nothing to prevent the parties charged with selecting judges
from bringing their . . . political . . . values to bear on the selection . . . .”).
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Commonwealth attorney general appoints judges to the High Court
and is criticized for making selections based on political patronage
224
rather than merit. Likewise, in South Africa, where judges were
appointed by the president at the advice of the minister of justice, the
process received criticism for pushing through judicial appointees that
225
were loyal to the current government’s views. Finally, because
American federal judges are promoted by the President, an incentive
exists for them to shape their decisions to curry favor with the current
administration.
b. Probationary Appointments.
Probationary appointments
provide another source of political pressure on judges. For example,
in Russia, federal judges are granted life tenure, but only after an
226
initial probationary three-year appointment. After three years, the
227
president chooses whether the judge will be reappointed.
Commentators suggest that judges who make decisions consistent
228
with the president’s ideology are more likely to be reappointed. For
example, Lubov Osipkina was not reappointed after she spoke out
229
against government corruption.
Although this political pressure may not be permanent, it may
dictate judges’ decisions for a few years.
c. Judicial Transfers. Another source of political pressure on
judges results from the ability of the executive to transfer judges to
undesirable courts. If a political appointee determines whether judges
will maintain or improve their geographic location, judges have an
incentive to render decisions that are consistent with the political
appointee’s ideology.

223. Elizabeth Handsley, ‘The Judicial Whisper Goes Around’: Appointment of Judicial
Officers in Australia, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 208,
at 122, 123–24.
224. See id. at 126 (describing the controversial High Court appointment of a cabinet
minister who lacked the legal experience typical of other High Court appointees).
225. François du Bois, Judicial Selection in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in APPOINTING
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 208, at 280, 283–84.
226. Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, The Russian Federation 9 (Aug. 27, 2002), http://www.icj.org/
IMG/pdf/Russia_chapter-final_Copy_.pdf.
227. See id. at 14.
228. See, e.g., id. at 9 (“[J]udges who were compliant with the executive were said to stand
the best chance of receiving a life appointment . . . .”).
229. Id. at 14.
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For example, judges in Japan face strong political pressure from
the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) through the lever of
230
judicial transfers. The LDP uses the appointment power of the
cabinet to ensure a politically compliant Supreme Court and
231
Secretariat. The Secretariat, in turn, decides which judges obtain the
232
best postings. Empirical analyses suggest that when judges render
decisions contrary to the interest of the LDP, the Secretariat punishes
233
them with transfers to unattractive posts in obscure courts. As a
result, most judges are deterred from ruling against the interests of
the LDP.
Similarly, in India, the president has employed the power of
234
transfer to exert pressure on judges. The president has transferred
several High Court judges that delivered judgments against the
government’s interests to unpopular regions of the country, where the
235
judges suffer lower living standards and language barriers. The
transfer power may motivate at least some judges to issue rulings that
are favorable to the government.
The same thing can happen in Mexico. A ruling against the
interest of the government can result in a federal judge being
236
transferred to another region.
d. Judicial Salaries and Budgets. Government control over
judicial salaries and court budgets is another way that political parties
can pressure judges. For example, the judicial branch of Venezuela
lacks financial autonomy; it has to submit an annual budget to the
237
executive branch, which may reduce or amend the budget. Some
commentators argue that executive control over the courts’ budget is

230. J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN 10–12, 57 (2003).
231. Id. at 126.
232. Id. at 60–61.
233. Id. at 48–61.
234. Shimon Shetreet, Judicial Independence: New Conceptual Dimensions and
Contemporary Challenges, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 590,
608 (Shimon Shetreet & Jules Deschenes eds., 1985).
235. See id.
236. See Jon Mills, Principles for Constitutions and Institutions in Promoting the Rule of
Law, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 115, 126 n.31 (2004).
237. Josefina Calcaño de Temeltas, Commentary, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 997, 998 (1996).
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one of the primary means by which the executive branch pressures
238
the courts, and thus it is a main obstacle to judicial independence.
239
240
241
Similarly, judges in Japan, India, and Nigeria have reason to
fear cuts in compensation if they rule against the government.
Thus, many systems with permanent tenure for judges, including
both the U.S. federal court system and many foreign court systems,
do achieve a degree of judicial accountability. Nevertheless, research
shows that most citizens do not want to “give up their vote” when it
242
comes to reelecting state court judges. Because people generally
prefer to reelect their state court judges, judicial elections will need to
be altered, rather than eliminated.
B. Reforming Judicial Elections
Instead of abolishing judicial retention completely, contested
elections could be abolished and replaced with merit plans, which
combine merit selection with retention elections. Under these plans, a
“bipartisan judicial nominating commission . . . . reviews applications
243
for judgeships [and then] compiles a list of [qualified] applicants.”
The commission submits this list to the governor, who appoints one of
244
the candidates from the list of recommendations. “Once appointed,
the judges regularly face . . . [unopposed] retention elections,” in
which incumbent judges appear on a ballot asking voters only
245
“whether . . . the judge should [be retained] in office.”
This reform ensures that citizens still have a voice through
retention elections and can hold judges accountable. Moreover,

238. See, e.g., MARK UNGAR, ELUSIVE REFORM: DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN
LATIN AMERICA 153 (2002) (describing the negative effects on the justice system due to a
politicized judicial budget).
239. See RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 230, at 21–22, 37–38, 59–60 (using data
analysis to demonstrate that the Japanese government slows judges’ salary advancements
following unfavorable rulings).
240. See Shetreet, supra note 234, at 608.
241. See Okechukwu Oko, Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of the
Problems and Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 9, 37–38 (2005) (“‘One
of the whips used by civil servants to force Judges to ‘behave’ is in the allocation of residential
quarters . . . .’ It is therefore not surprising that some judges go out of their way to demonstrate
their fealty to the executive.” (quoting P.O.E. BASSEY, THE NIGERIAN JUDICIARY: THE
DEPARTING GLORY 20 (2000))).
242. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1082.
243. Caufield, supra note 77, at 627–28.
244. Id. at 628.
245. Id.
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because elections would be uncontested, candidates would no longer
have to raise as many campaign contributions. Thus, judges would no
longer have to vote in a way that would help them obtain
contributions. In addition, because the retention rate of incumbents
in retention elections is much higher than that in contested election
246
systems, judges would not have to appeal so relentlessly to
constituents. Indeed, my empirical results show that retention politics
have almost no influence on the voting of judges under merit plan
247
systems.
Merit plans are imperfect, however. For example, the selection
commissions that compile the lists of candidates for the governor are
248
typically partisan in both their composition and deliberations. Thus,
judges may still be selected based on their political preferences. In
contrast to systems with contested reelections, however, once they are
on the bench, there will be much less pressure on the judges to vote
with the political preferences of the retention agents. Although there
have been some instances in which judges were not retained in
retention elections following heated political campaigns against
249
250
them, incumbents are very rarely defeated in retention elections.
C. Reforming Campaign Finance
As with the excessive influence from retention politics, the sure
way to eliminate money’s influence on judges’ decisions is to
eliminate judicial elections. Because of the accountability model’s
popularity, however, this is probably politically infeasible. The
following is a brief outline of several proposals that attempt to reduce
251
money’s influence, without eliminating elections.

246. Hall, supra note 96, at 177 (presenting data indicating that incumbents lose 1.8 percent
of sampled retention elections compared with 7.4 percent in sampled nonpartisan elections and
22.9 percent in sampled partisan elections).
247. See supra table accompanying note 193.
248. McLeod, supra note 167, at 513.
249. For details of these campaigns, see Reid, supra note 127, at 49–59; Robert S.
Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California
Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2036–42 (1988).
250. Hall, supra note 96, at 177.
251. For a more detailed discussion of these and other proposals, see McLeod, supra note
167, at 515–21.
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Although the government cannot constitutionally impose
252
some states have
spending limits on political campaigns,
experimented with voluntary spending limits as a way to reduce
253
judges’ dependence on contributions. There is little incentive,
however, for judges to comply with the voluntary limits; voters do not
254
appear to punish judges that refuse to comply.
Other states have experimented with publicly funding judicial
255
races. The states provide direct cash payments to candidates in
judicial races, and in return, the candidates who accept public funding
256
agree to spend only the publicly provided funds. Although publicly
financing elections reduces judges’ dependence on campaign
contributions, it would not necessarily make judges more
independent. Because independent special interest groups would not
be similarly limited in their spending to oppose candidates, judges
would still face pressure to vote in ways that do not provoke
257
opposition.
Finally, states could consider tightening their recusal rules.
Although state ethics codes generally require judges to recuse
258
themselves in cases in which they have a conflict, the codes have
generally not been interpreted to require recusal merely because a
259
case involves a campaign contributor.
Requiring recusal when a case involves a campaign contributor,
however, would create at least two difficulties. First, although
stronger recusal rules may eliminate any bias in judges’ voting toward
specific attorneys or litigants that individually contributed to their
252. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for
Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133, 139–42
(1998) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)).
253. For example, Texas and New York have tried this approach. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.
§ 253.164(a) (Vernon 2003) (requiring either voluntary compliance with spending limits or a
declaration of intent to exceed limits); SARA MATHIAS, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, ELECTING
JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORMS 45 (1990) (describing a judicial
election in Rochester, New York).
254. See MATHIAS, supra note 253, at 45 (describing an election in which seven of eight
judicial candidates pledged to limit their spending to $25,000, whereas the eighth candidate
spent $100,000 and won the election).
255. For example, North Carolina fully funds all candidates for appellate courts and
Wisconsin provides partial funding for its supreme court candidates. Michael W. Bowers, Public
Financing of Judicial Campaigns: Practices and Prospects, 4 NEV. L.J. 107, 116 (2003).
256. Id. at 118.
257. McLeod, supra note 167, at 519.
258. MATHIAS, supra note 253, at 52.
259. McLeod, supra note 167, at 520.
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campaign, it would not eliminate all or even most bias. It would still
permit judges to participate in cases in which the contributor was not
a litigant or an attorney, but in which the contributor had an interest.
For example, stricter recusal rules would not prevent a judge who had
received contributions from a medical-association tort-reform group
from ruling in medical malpractice tort cases.
Second, as a practical matter, if campaign contributions are
permitted, then stricter recusal rules would be impossible in many
communities. In communities with small numbers of lawyers and
small numbers of judges, strict recusal rules might require judges to
recuse themselves in almost every case. In these communities, the
only way to prevent these wholesale recusals would be to prohibit
lawyers from contributing to campaigns. But this would probably be
unconstitutional.
Perhaps campaign contributions are simply inconsistent with
maintaining the judiciary’s legitimacy. Reasonable minds can differ
about whether it is appropriate under the accountability model for a
judge to face modest pressure from the citizens of the judge’s own
jurisdiction. It seems much worse for campaign contributions to allow
wealthy groups and individuals, many of whom are not even from the
judge’s jurisdiction, to generate great pressure on judges.
And yet it is far from clear that campaign spending in judicial
elections has purely negative consequences. For example, when
candidates spend money on their campaigns, they provide
information to allow voters to make more informed decisions. With
campaign contributions, voters must rely on a contest of biased
information. Without contributions, voters have next to no
information. Moreover, the more money that is spent in judicial
260
elections, the higher the levels of voter participation. A vigorous
campaign stimulates voter interest and fewer voters are
disenfranchised by ignorance.
CONCLUSION
My empirical results suggest that recent trends may threaten the
necessary balance between judicial independence and accountability.
The results about the increasingly contentious retention politics

260. Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau, Mobilizing Interest: The Effect of Money on
Ballot Roll-Off in State Supreme Court Elections 17, 28 tbl.5 (Apr. 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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suggest that in states with certain retention systems, retention politics
strongly affect many case outcomes. The results suggest that judges
may frequently shape their rulings on many different subject matters
to appeal to retention agents. The subject matters range widely, from
all cases in which an individual faces a business, to labor disputes, to
medical malpractice cases, to other tort cases, to products liability
261
cases, to criminal appeals. And the magnitude of politics’ influence
on judges’ rulings is substantial, often making it much more likely that
a judge will vote to favor the retention agent’s preferences.
Like the impact of retention politics, the recent flow of campaign
money into judicial elections has also affected judges’ rulings across a
wide range of subjects. Also like the effect of retention politics, the
impact of the new campaign money is large, often making it
substantially more likely that a judge’s rulings will favor campaign
contributors.
Together, competitive judicial politics and campaign money may
influence judges’ decisions so profoundly that the important balance
between judicial accountability and independence is threatened.
Reforms must eliminate the intense pressure on judges to vote in a
way that attracts votes and campaign contributions. There is no sign
that the politicization of state supreme courts and elections to them is
lessening. Until reforms are enacted, the application of impartial
justice is at risk.

261.

See supra text accompanying note 191.
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262

262. The table reports the marginal effects of each variable on the probability of a judge
voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The indicator variables for years,
general issue in the case, and general industry of the business litigant are not reported for
brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5
percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

